

defence, would hardly shew the same union or spirit in offensive measures. The commercial interests of France and Spain seem also to mark the independence of North America as an object of great importance. In that country, France will find a prodigious vent for her silks and velvets. Wine also, imported as it may be without the present burdens, will come to an excellent market in a country where it is not made, though the nature of the climate requires a copious use of it. For these, and other manufactures of those kingdoms, the Americans will make remittances in rice, tobacco, flour, naval stores, and the other natural produce of their country. The expence and trouble of a circuitous trade will then be prevented, and a direct intercourse be established between states whose mutual wants seem to point out a friendly intercourse. It would be tedious to describe the advantages which the French sugar islands must derive from the independence of the British colonies. If Great Britain, after this revolt, should retain her sugar islands, she must do it under prodigious disadvantages, by which the price of her sugars must rise at least 30 *per cent*; hence the French sugar would come to a better market in Europe, and the Americans would buy none else. If the sugar islands should fall off with the other colonies, the African trade and other circumstances considered, France must be an equal gainer by your misfortune. Having mentioned the general arguments which may induce the maritime states to wish well to America