

defections in the Council of Ministers. Despite the commitment spelled out in the Treaty on European Union to "support the Union's external ... policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity ....", the U.K. and others demonstrated on this particular issue that frequently Union "solidarity" is little more than a rhetorical device. Nonetheless, Canadian interests were compromised by the fact that there is a Common Fisheries Policy as they have been by other aspects of the Community's policies. This incident illustrates very well the frequently permeable boundaries between "Pillar I", the European Community, and "Pillar II", the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Parenthetically, the IGC is likely also to strengthen "Pillar III", Justice and Home Affairs, again with consequences for third parties. The difficulties occasioned by the fisheries dispute did not arise from the CFSP so much as from other aspects of the Union's external policies.

This is not the case with what may be termed the structural implications of the CFSP. As has been alluded to already, the institutional basis of the CFSP, the internal processes of consultation and decision-making, and the limited consensus amongst the member states on many foreign policy issues, make it very difficult for third parties to gain a hearing for their own particular concerns. It is not simply a problem of the adequacy of consultative mechanisms, although this is a problem for Canada, but that as yet the CFSP neither in substance or in form can be said to constitute a foreign and security policy. To paraphrase Davignon, the Union may have secured for itself a political vocation, but it is a long way from establishing itself as a polity. For third parties the *sui generis* nature of the CFSP is a problem in itself, as it is for that matter with the other two "pillars" of the Union. The point has been put another way by Christopher Hill and William Wallace when they argue that the member states have established a "collective presence" internationally, but do not have the ability to act collectively except through a cumbersome internal consultative process that is coupled with only limited economic and military instruments able to effect policy. With respect to the CFSP, the Union may be a presence internationally, but it can not be said to be an international actor.<sup>9</sup>

Whereas the structural character of the CFSP already impinges on how Canada manages its relationship with Europe, the strategic impact of the CFSP is at present a muted one. This reflects the limited scope of the CFSP and its limited ability to effect policy. Nonetheless, the influence of the CFSP on the policies of member states and its potential as the vehicle for a European foreign and security policy are an important component of Canada's altered strategic landscape. In particular, the familiar institutional and diplomatic instruments by which Canada has pursued its "high political" interests in the Atlantic area are no longer as effective as they once were. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the special relationship between Europe, as

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<sup>9</sup>"Introduction", Christopher Hill (ed.) *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 1966, p.13. Hill and Wallace also argue (*loc cit*) that Europe's evolving foreign policy system "can be understood only if the traditional bond between "actorness" and national sovereignty is dissolved." My point, however, is that Europe can not be said to have a common foreign and security policy until operationally and effectively the link between national sovereignty and foreign policy *is* in fact dissolved. This is a long way from occurring.