

by UNAMIR. There was also a RG radio propaganda campaign against UNAMIR when UNAMIR turned down their proposal to co-administer the airport. There appeared to be little chance of a ceasefire.

The SGSR and FC Dallaire recommended (opt 2) downsizing within 2 days to 200-300 with a revised mandate of only political reconciliation. The SG decided not to place that recommendation in his report due but not delivered today as this would undermine his option for strengthening. The onus would remain on the SC to alter the status quo. The permanent representative of Rwanda called the SG and recommended that UNAMIR be reinforced.

At the TCN afternoon meeting, the African TCNs (especially Ghana & Togo & Senegal) wanted to increase the UNAMIR and argued the precedent of Cambodia and Bosnia. Uruguay and Tunisia and others were for option 2, as was Canada who elected to be guided by the FC's assessment/recommendations.

The prefect of Butare who had been keeping calm in the city was replaced by a military man from the north and calls went out over mille collines radio calling for the killing of "accomplices" in Butare. The prefect had asked for UNAMIR protection in the past week, but the 16 UNMOs were withdrawn from Butare early on the 20th which completed the total retreat of UNAMIR throughout Rwanda to Kigali. The evening of the 19th units of the Presidential Guard flew in from Kigali and extensive massacres began concurrently with UNAMIR's departure.

20 April

In a briefing to SC, USG Gharekhan apologised without explanation that the requested SG's report on Rwanda on had not been delivered on schedule yesterday and promised it for the 21st. The SC President NZ indicated frustration about the delayed report as it was necessary before any decision could be taken by the SC.

Reportedly DPKO was supporting the FC's and SGSR's recommendation to downsize immediately to about 300.

The Nigerian ambassador said there had been progress at talks in Kampala between the Rwandan Ambassador, the RPF rep, and the US ambassador. Talks had also been arranged for the 23rd in Arusha.

On the ground, there had been no progress on a ceasefire, no further shelling of the stadium, and UNAMIR was assisting ICRC medical teams. The airport was surrounded by government troops and the zones neutrality was in jeopardy. 264 non-essential UNAMIR had been evacuated, and apart from 87 UNMOs still in the DMZ, all 1707 UNAMIR forces were in Kigali (down from 6 April strength of 2,486 following departure of Belgian contingent and 'non-essential personnel')

Humanitarian agencies and NGOs were positioning themselves for move back into Rwanda eg . WFP had stocked 4000 mt of food in Tanzania. At the UNDP sponsored Rwandan humanitarian cell meeting in Nairobi, it was decided that the IFRC would be located in Bujumbura to handle refugee camps in Rwanda and the UNHCR would look after refugees in Burundi.

21 April

The SC presented his Special Report on UNAMIR S/1994/470 setting out 3 options: 1-immediate massive reinforcement, 2-reduced presence, 3-withdrawal. He did not support option 3 but did not indicate his preference for 1 or 2 in what was seen by some as a defensive move if whatever choice made subsequently 'failed'. SG said he would have another formal report for the SC within 2 weeks.

The US after having long argued to abandon UNAMIR, now wanted to maintain its strength above that of option 2 but still lower than at present. The Africans appeared prepared to go along with option 2 since the terms would permit the reinforcing of UNAMIR if circumstances permitted.

Only Nigeria, Oman, Djibouti, Rwanda and France spoke. The Rwandan perm rep criticised double standards where increased threats to a mission in one instance was followed by reinforcements, while in Rwanda it reduced