

⁹¹ Quoted from the Secretary-General's appearance in CNN's "Global Forum", Atlanta, Georgia, June 1, 2000. See, The Secretary-General Off The Cuff, available @ <http://www.un.org?News/oss/sgcu0500.htm>

⁹² See, Kofi Annan, "The Quiet Revolution", *Global Governance*, no. 4, 1998, p. 128.

⁹³ Confusion was partially compounded by the announcement that the Government of Canada would be conducting an in-depth study into the option of a UN Standing Force.

⁹⁴ Even prior to the League of Nations, it was understood that an effective collective security system would provide states with more than simply a security guarantor. For one, it would reduce tensions, thereby, allowing all to reduce their national defence expenditures and devote those resources to other pressing challenges. It would also restore the conditions necessary for wider, if not universal, disarmament. In short, an empowered UN holds considerable promise to introduce further co-operation in a mutually-reinforcing and progressively positive manner. For a more contemporary assessment of the potential of UN rapid deployment capabilities see, The Centre for Defense Information, "The United Nations At Fifty: A Force For The Future", *The Defense Monitor*, vol. XXV, no. 1, January 1, 1996.

⁹⁵ Fortunately, the arrangements now being implemented are not a "done deal." They represent a relatively promising start, yet they need not, and should not, be viewed as having achieved sufficient reliability or sophisticated capability.

⁹⁶ The term 'soft power' has been interpreted as entailing the ability to communicate, negotiate, mobilise opinion, work within multilateral bodies and promote international initiatives. It is essentially about increasing political leverage to advance peaceful change by building new partnerships and coalitions not only between governments, but also with other elements of civil society such as NGOs, related agencies, the media and interested parties. The term was coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990). It has since become a foreign policy strategy for a growing number of small and middle powers. For a Canadian perspective see, Lloyd Axworthy, "Why 'soft power' is the right policy for Canada", *Ottawa Citizen*, April 25, 1998.

⁹⁷ Unfortunately, at least in the near term, there is unlikely to be further research of this evolution within government, and there is little evidence of government assistance for related research. Neither is a research programme of this nature on the agenda of the UN Secretariat or DPKO. Major-General Frank van Kappen, suggested that a study of a UN Standing Emergency Group would have to be conducted in co-operation with other UN Departments. Yet, one should not be overly optimistic about the prospects of these departments engaging in a co-operative inquiry that many member states do not support. van Kappen acknowledged, however, that "further studies could be done by establishing Working groups to present their reports to DPKO. Working Groups could either be established within UNHQ and/or Member States could sponsor a Working Group. Studies could be conducted in a sponsor country with participants from Member States, as well as from UNHQ." See, Major-General Frank van Kappen, MILAD, DPKO, "Implementation of the Canadian Recommendation on Rapid Reaction Capability," Summary of Presentation on 4 Dec. 1995, pp1-4.

⁹⁸ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report*, (Washington D.C., Carnegie Commission, 1997), p. 156.

⁹⁹ Cora Weiss, speech to Millennium Forum, United Nations, NY, May 23, 2000, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ This section draws on the previous work of Peter Langille, Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes, and Major James Hammond, "A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability," in Cox and Legault, *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities*, pp. 179-200.

¹⁰¹ Article 43 (1) of the United Nations Charter states that, "All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities..."

¹⁰² See James A. Leach and Charles M. Lichenstein (co-chairs), Final Report, "Defining Purpose: The UN and the Health of Nations", U.S. Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993), p. 6 and 20. Cited in John G. Heidenrich, "Why U.S. Conservatives Should Support A U.N. Legion", unpublished paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994, p. 21.

¹⁰³ *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁴ *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability*, p. 60. A Canadian discussion paper on the issue also acknowledges that, "it would provide the UN with a small but totally reliable, well-trained and cohesive group for deployment by the Security Council in urgent situations. It would break one of the key log-jams in the current UN system, namely the insistence by troop contributing nations that they authorise the use of their national forces prior to each deployment. It would also simplify command and control arrangements in UN peace support operations, and put an end to conflicts between UN commanders and contingent commanders reporting to national authorities." DFAIT, "Improving the "UN's Rapid Reaction Capability: Discussion Paper," 29 April 1995, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 112.