

outcome.<sup>93</sup> Cases in which deterrence and compellence are practised simultaneously pose a different problem. Here, the appropriate response would be to separate these kinds of cases for purposes of analysis. As the analysis of deterrence in these encounters will be "contaminated" by the practice of compellence, compound cases of this kind should be treated as distinct for analytic purposes.

A third conceptual difficulty is the designation of the challenger and defender. Deterrence theory models a relationship by specifying two distinct roles: one party is a challenger and the other the defender. But these roles are often blurred in practice. Not infrequently, both sides view themselves as the deterrer and their adversary as the challenger. The Cuban missile crisis nicely illustrates the blurring of roles by the parties. The Kennedy administration — and Western scholars who have written about the crisis — had no doubt that the United States was the defender and the Soviet Union the challenger. The United States was trying to deter the Soviet Union from deploying offensive weapons in Cuba. But Soviet officials testify that one of their motives for deploying missiles in Cuba was to deter the United States from invading Cuba or from exploiting its strategic superiority to intimidate the Soviet Union.<sup>94</sup>

As we have seen, the Taiwan Straits crises offer another example of this phenomenon. The parties to these kinds of deterrence encounters are like the characters in Lawrence Durrell's *The Alexandria Quartet*. Each has a different, sometimes clashing, and equally valid, view of the social reality they all collectively create. To interpret this reality only through the prism of any one of the protagonists is to adopt, by definition, a partisan point of view. This is also applicable to the analysis of deterrence. To classify the Taiwan Straits crises as deterrence encounters is to adopt Washington's perspective on the world. To categorize American policy as compellence is to accept the Chinese diagnosis. In practice, it is essential for analysts to consider

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<sup>93</sup> Some of the differences between deterrence and compellence in peacetime and wartime are discussed in Lebow, *Between Peace and War*.

<sup>94</sup> Lebow, "Provocative Deterrence," and Lebow and Stein, *Who Is the Enemy?*, ch.3.