

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

However, the United States in actual fact has not been adhering to these crucial provisions, and has been putting forward various fabricated pretexts to sidestep these agreements.

It is now strenuously argued that the Strategic Defence Initiative programme is allegedly purely defensive and does not threaten anyone, that it is almost the only way to eliminate nuclear weapons and to strengthen stability, that the offensive devices which are being developed are merely harmless, and that the SDI is just a research programme.

That argument, however sophisticated, cannot mislead anyone. In connection with this, legitimate questions are raised over and over again. For instance, if the SDI is a way to eliminate nuclear weapons, then why does the United States continue increasingly to create new types of strategic offensive weapons, to develop thousands of cruise missiles, and to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe?

If the SDI is a way to stability, why do the leaders of the United States declare that it would be terrible if the Soviet Union were the first to create an anti-missile shield?

If the SDI is mere research, then can one imagine that the United States, having spent tens of billions of dollars in the coming years, will then give up their idea simply because "the Russians will not agree to its development"?

We sometimes hear United States representatives declare that the USSR effort in the field of defence technology is much bigger than the American one and the American research is designed to establish parity with the advances made by the USSR. Were we to believe this, would it not be more advantageous and less difficult from every standpoint for the United States Administration to agree with the USSR proposals to prohibit research and to open up on a mutual basis the relevant laboratories and other institutions dealing with military research in order to verify that they are not developing offensive space weapons?

We believe that this would be the simplest, most expeditious and most effective means to solve the problem of safeguarding outer space from weapons. Moreover, we believe that one of the effective avenues leading to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

When there are no nuclear explosions, the basis will also disappear for the improvement of nuclear weaponry and the creation of new types and varieties of such weapons, including X-ray lasers for deployment in outer space. At the same time there will be a qualitative reduction of nuclear charges as a result of their obsolescence and, in future, a progressive disappearance of nuclear weapons. As a result, the expensive strategic delivery systems for nuclear charges designed to span inter-continental distances would simply become unprofitable, and their use would provide no strategic advantage.