

- a treaty prohibition of nuclear tests, with effective verification to provide adequate assurance of compliance, would be an additional qualitative restraint on the nuclear weapons development process and thus have an impact on vertical proliferation;
- as a multilateral treaty to which non-nuclear weapons states as well as nuclear weapons states might adhere, it would also have value in reinforcing the international system to prevent horizontal proliferation,
- Canada believes that a comprehensive test ban should be pursued as a matter of urgency as stipulated in paragraph 51 of the final document of the Special Session. We understand that the negotiations now being pursued by the USA, the UK and the USSR are close to conclusion and we can look forward to early consideration of the results in the Committee on Disarmament.

On many occasions, and most recently during the Special Session, Canada and many other states have drawn attention to the fact that agreement on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would also contribute to the ending of the nuclear arms race. We welcome the explicit recognition of this approach in paragraph 50 of the final document of the Special Session on Disarmament. Obviously, as is the case with many other measures in the disarmament field, the usefulness of such an agreement would depend on the application of effective verification measures, which in this instance should include acceptance of full-scope or comprehensive safeguards under the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) or some equivalent system.

The objective, in our opinion, should be the elaboration by the Committee on Disarmament of a multilateral treaty, to which both non-nuclear and nuclear weapon states might adhere, prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and prohibiting the diversion for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices of any fissionable material produced in connection with peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such a measure would have the advantage of focussing in the same instrument on both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, before negotiations could proceed very far in the multilateral phase, it would be desirable for the two major nuclear powers, and any other nuclear weapons states willing to participate, to explore the "cut-off" aspects, including the verification aspects applying particularly to nuclear weapons states. Verification backed up by full-scope safeguards would ensure that all parties to such an eventual treaty would be bound essentially to the safeguards accepted by the non-nuclear weapons states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada therefore believes that it would be appropriate, especially in view of the renewed interest shown in this subject, that this question be given early consideration in the Committee on Disarmament.

Two other elements of the "strategy of suffocation" would be agreements to stop flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, and to