

phenomena and (b) the possibility of analysing them. The old conflict between materialism and spiritualism (so far, at least, as Psychology is concerned) has quite worn itself out. Psychology tells us of concrete mentality—describes the life we live as conscious beings—but it tells us nothing of the mind's ultimate nature. To tell us this is the province of Ethics, Metaphysics and Theology.

When the mind of Greece was turned inward, it found there a complex group of phenomena, and, as it had already done with the experiences of natural objects, at once began a comparison between these, putting together the like and separating the unlike, sorting into divisions and ending in finding several distinct groups. Accordingly, whilst the underlying unity was never lost sight of, yet it was natural to suppose that the soul possesses as many separate functions as there were groups of phenomena left unresolvable by observation. Such a procedure was the beginning of the later doctrine of mental faculties. Plato first among the Greeks 'separated' mind from body. His threefold distribution of the human faculties into Reason, Impulse and Appetite was made rather from an ethical interest, than as a result of accurate observation. Though schematic, it gave some semblance of order, and afforded a starting point at least for Psychology.

Aristotle (in his *De Anima*), gathering up into one the work of Plato and his predecessors, may be said to have laid the foundation of Psychology. In his treatise we find the struggle of two methods for the mastery. He attempted to make Psychology a Science on its own merits, separate from Ethics and Metaphysics; but his mind was so permeated with the system of Philosophy, begun by Socrates and

carried further by Plato, which finds the explanation of what *is* in what *ought* to be, that his entire Psychological doctrine is *informed* with ideas brought from the sphere of Metaphysics; yet, through his keenness of observation, and his search for the causal connection, he seems to have caught a glimpse of a distinctively modern doctrine. He conceived the development of the soul as running parallel to that of the body; the physical functions as organic to the mental; and his method in the *De Anima* is apparently, at least, a biological-developmental one. The sensitive (vegetative), the connotative, and the intellectual, were not so many different parts into which soul is divided—but only different sides or aspects of mental action. It is the same soul that manifests itself in these various forms of psychical activity—the unity in which they are all embraced—as he says in the *Metaphysics*.

Aristotle, while giving independent functional value to Intellect and Desire, subordinated feeling to these; and this two-fold scheme remained long the prevailing one. It survived in Reid's "Intellectual and Moral Powers," and in the common sense Psychology of every day life. This overlooking of feeling as a separate phase, Sully attributes to its special inaccessibility to observation. Leibnitz looked upon feeling as a vague or imperfect cognition. The German Psychologists of the Wolffian School first recognized feeling as a phase of mind co-ordinate with Intellect and Will. Wolff was the originator of the so-called theory of mental faculties. Kant adopted the tripartite division and his authority, until Herbart's coming, seemed to exercise a Medusa-like influence on those to whom the doctrine was preached. Yet, after the general recognition of the fundamental distinctness of feeling, by some the three modes of mental function