

ledge itself; or, should he, as would have done a Cato, have acquired knowledge with reference only to what it could produce? Should he possess a liberal education; or that sort of knowledge which we now term useful? Should he possess refinement and enlargement of mind; or only sufficient knowledge of Latin to translate Gregory or the Pharmacopœia? Should he possess liberal knowledge, or, as it has been happily termed, a gentleman's knowledge—which, to possess it, is something, though it produce nothing;—or that utilitarian knowledge which is of use only when acted upon? Should it be the education which is philosophical, which rises to, and is enriched with, ideas; or servile and mechanical, and which expends itself upon what is external and visible? Should it be the education which gives a high tone of thought, a high standard of judgment; or that education which merely makes of the memory a passive receptacle of scraps and fragments of knowledge, to be served out confusedly and without method. The education I vindicate should give cultivation to the intellect; it should give a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life. It should open the mind, correct it and refine it, and enable it to “know and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, and give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address.” With the intellect, thus tutored and instructed, the student might enter upon the study of that most difficult profession of which we are members; engage in a calling the due discharge of which requires all the attributes of the mind, and the highest culture of the intellect; and pursue with advantage a particular course of study which might issue in some definite, and, perhaps, remunerative work. It may be gathered from this that I share not with those arch levellers who advocate a low Utilitarianism; but rather with those who think the student should be formed “not by a parsimonious admeasurement of studies to some definite future object; but by taking a wide and liberal compass, and thinking a great deal on many subjects, with no better end in view, perhaps, than because the exercise is one which makes him a more rational and intelligent being.” But this is not what has been obtained for us recently in a hurriedly prepared law relating to our profession in an important province of this Dominion, where our colleges and seminaries of learning have been degraded from their position. The graduate in arts, the student who has completed his eight or nine years curriculum at any of our colleges, should, by that fact