

Havre than usual, and no flat-bottomed-boats¹, with which the *English* ministry affected to be so much frightened.

IN this situation what did the *British* ministry do? They had certain intelligence that there was a *real* armament at *Toulon* of twelve men of war of the line, five frigates, &c. ready to convoy a powerful army, openly acknowledged by the enemy to be designed against *Minorca*: and they could not be ignorant of the distress *Mabon* was in for want of a sufficient garrison, miners, pioneers, &c. and the danger of its falling a prey to so powerful an attack, for want of a superior fleet to cover the island from such an attempt; yet all this could only procure an order on the 8th of *March* for ten ships of the line to hold themselves in readiness for the *Mediterranean*: which squadron was, on the 11th of the same month put under the command of Admiral *Byng*, with an order for him to take on board the Earl of *Effingham*, General *Stuart*, and other officers and private men, ordered to their respective posts and corps at *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*. But the equipping of those ten ships² was attended with

¹ Capt. *Saumarez*, of the *Ludlow Castle*, off *Havre*, received the 9th. He further said, that he stood in as near as possible in a cutter, and saw eight sail, four of which were large ships and ready for sea; and was informed by a fisherman he took on the coast, that they were two frigates of 26 guns ordered to convoy two others to *Brest*.

² The *Ramillies* of 90 guns, the *Culloden* of 74, the *Buckingham*, *Captain*, and *Revenge* of 70 guns, the *Trident* and *Intrepid* of 64, the *Lancaster* of 66, the *Kingston* and *Defiance* of 60 guns.