

16. Nowhere in the works of these different writers, nowhere in the Statutes, is there one word or sentence leading one to the belief that the object of an inquest can be anything but the search for homicide.

When Statutes and commentators enter into details, they emphasize even more strongly this single aim. For instance, section 2 of the Statute 4 Edw. I., already cited, declares upon what the verdict should rest. "He shall declare", it says, "where the man has been killed; whether in a house, a field, etc.," and the above named authors, commenting thereon, repeat thereafter that the verdict shall contain a declaration affirming or denying homicide, designating the time and place, when and where committed, indicating in what manner it was committed, and denouncing the perpetrator. Nothing further.

17. So true is it that this is the sole aim recognised by English law, that the Coroner's Act, revising the whole law, in 1887, states in sub-section 3 of Article IV, that the verdict shall contain, apart from the designation of the defunct, the place, time and circumstances of his death; whether he has been killed or not, and by whom. Nothing further.

18. Of all our various Statutes which have legislated on this subject in Canada, none have given the Coroner any object other than the search for homicide. It is true that the recognition of this principle has nowhere been formally stated, but it has been implicitly conveyed by each new law.

Is it not plainly indicated by Article 69 of the Civil Code, (prohibiting the interment of corpses bearing marks of violence, or of persons who have died under circumstances of a nature to give rise to suspicions of violence) that the sole object thereof is the search for homicide?

If this does not suffice, let us turn to the Statute of Quebec, regulating actually such cases as call for the summoning of a jury.

This Statute of 1895, Chapter 26, declares that there shall be no inquest save when there is good reason to believe that