RECOMMENDATION 111

The Committee recommends that all research and support staff of the sub-committee undergo security assessments and that all senior staff be cleared to the Top Secret Special Activity level and be placed under an appropriate oath.

RECOMMENDATION 112

The Committee recommends that the sub-committee meet *in camera* in a secure environment and that all notes and documents relating to its work be retained in a secure environment.

The Committee considers that it would be inappropriate for Members of Parliament to be vetted by the Service. It believes, however, that Members of Parliament who serve on special committees of either the House of Commons or the Senate who see classified material should be placed under an appropriate oath.

The Committee recognizes that continuity of membership on the sub-committee and in staffing is important for a variety of reasons. Continuity of membership and staff will build expertise and experience, as well as confidence in the Committee by both the public and the security and intelligence community. Too much turnover among membership and staff may increase the possibility of leaks and make it more difficult to identify the source of such leaks should they occur. In addition, security assessments of staff to the Top Secret Special Activity level are the most time-consuming and costly to perform.

RECOMMENDATION 113

The Committee recommends that the Party leaders attempt to ensure continuity, security and integrity in membership on the sub-committee for the duration of a Parliament.

The Committee has already set out a number of safeguards that should be incorporated into this scheme. It believes one further safeguard is in order.

RECOMMENDATION 114

The Committee recommends that, before submitting any report to any other committee of the House of Commons or to the House of Commons as a whole, the sub-committee develop procedures to establish whether the release of any information in such reports could pose a threat to the security of Canada.