

matters of vital security interest, can question the complexity of the difficulties that must be overcome in order to achieve worthwhile measures of restraint with regard to strategic weapons. Nonetheless, if the momentum of the negotiations so painstakingly achieved in past years is not to be lost and the prospects of success diminished, Canada strongly believes that new, bold steps forward at the earliest possible date are desirable — even essential. At this juncture, it would be appropriate for the Assembly to leave the two negotiating powers in no doubt about the profound hope of the international community that these talks will soon result in the conclusion of SALT II, and permit progress to the third stage of SALT, which should lead to further and substantial reductions in strategic weapons.

**Non-proliferation**

The other side of the same coin is the pressing need to improve the international non-proliferation system, to strengthen safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty more effectively and to re-examine the risks inherent in various nuclear cycles and processes. This task is all the more important because the world must increasingly come to terms with a growing energy shortage, and many countries are looking to nuclear energy as an alternative to conventional sources. In this field, Canada has had long experience, as a producer and a supplier, of both uranium and proved nuclear technology. We recognize the contribution we can make as an exporter to the energy-poor countries, both industrialized and developing. At the same time, we attach the highest importance to developing the most effective international system of safeguards possible in order to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the capability to produce them.

This policy stems from concerns that go beyond commercial considerations. We have made clear that we are prepared to sacrifice potential gains rather than accept less-than-satisfactory controls. Canada has rejected the nuclear-weapons option long ago and our policy on safeguards is the logical extension of our concern, and indeed our sense of responsibility, regarding non-proliferation. Accordingly, in the case of its exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to other non-nuclear-weapon states, Canada requires that such countries should either adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or otherwise make a binding non-proliferation commitment and accept IAEA-administered safeguards on their entire nuclear program (so-called "full-scope safeguards"). In seeking from others agreement to such controls and safeguards, we are asking for undertakings that Canada has already, and willingly, accepted. We welcome the fact that a number of other suppliers have adopted a similar policy. It is our hope that this condition will become a basic international requirement, facilitating international co-operation in the strictly peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Canada also welcomes the international nuclear-fuel-cycle evaluation project, which is about to get under way on a broad international basis. We appreciate that there are legitimate differences of opinion on the question of the desirability of different means of utilizing nuclear resources and technology, but we hope that this international study will give careful thought to alternative fuel-cycles that avoid the use of plutonium and improve safeguards. In our view, the international nuclear-fuel-cycle study project warrants the full support of the international community. The plain

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