

prisoner-of-war impasse and of bringing to an end the fighting in Korea. More than that, it signifies the crystallization of a moral force which no one would do well to oppose. To refer at this time, therefore, to the General Assembly resolution on Korea is not a retrograde or even a static gesture, despite its sardonic rejection by the North Korean and Chinese Communists and their apologists here, since the marshalling of universal moral force cannot be forever successfully opposed either by bitter communications addressed to the United Nations or by rhetorical attempts to confuse and divert attention from the true situation.

That situation is that the minority of the other side must show themselves responsive to the intent of the General Assembly resolution or stand exposed as intransigent for reasons of their own and determined against co-operation with all those countries striving for peace in Korea. It is now certainly up to them. We should not give up our efforts because the resolution has been rejected. If they say they cannot accept its actual terms, let them meet its spirit by offering helpful proposals of their own, rather than fabricating wordy smoke-screens and useless camouflages. Only in this way can they demonstrate that their faith is as good as that of the great majority of nations which have considered this problem, which is of fundamental importance to world peace.

The Soviet representative's speech of March 2, unfortunately, did not give a satisfactory answer to this challenge, although, as I hope to point out later, it did perhaps contain a hint that we should not abandon the idea of hearing something useful from him. The sole concrete proposal to be found in all of his oration on Monday was a repetition of the Soviet Union resolution submitted to this Committee on December 2 last, which was emphatically rejected, of course, when put to the vote. And even that resolution was restated by him in a deceptive way since he described it as a simple straightforward proposal for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It was neither simple nor straightforward, for it complicated the prisoner-of-war issue by tying it to political matters such as the unification of Korea.

By the Soviet Union proposal, the fate of the prisoners-of-war would be settled by a commission which would be established to deal with both the prisoners-of-war and political questions. There could be no true armistice where our prisoners could be used as pawns for political bargaining, as the representative of Australia pointed out the other day. We could not take away our forces while our prisoners were in enemy hands, leaving that enemy which a plausible pretext to retain the prisoners and to renew the fighting if the political negotiations were not to its liking. It was quite properly agreed that the armistice negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom should be confined to military matters, and therefore conducted by military representatives. The disposition of prisoners-of-war was an item of the armistice agenda. It is significant that the Soviet Union authorities themselves, when the armistice discussions were first initiated, actually adopted the attitude that only