sensibly and very rightly diminished. But although Japan is weaker as a result of this treaty, she is not prostrate, nor, I hope, bitter. I like to think also that this treaty is one treaty after a war which does not bear within it the seeds of future wars. We do not know about that, of course, for sure, and we may not know for many years. In signing a treaty of this type you have to take a calculated risk, but in view of the alternatives those risks on this occasion were worth taking.

This treaty brings Japan back into the family of free nations on the Pacific and gives her an opportunity to contribute to the peace and security there. We hope that she will take advantage of that opportunity. In any event 83 million disciplined, frugal, hard-working and intelligent people cannot be ignored, whether we sign a treaty with them or not.

We also had some special interests in this treaty and we made those known at the conference. We expressed the hope that Japan would not return to certain international trade practices of before the war which had caused so much trouble to so many countries, including our own. We were also interested in the fisheries question. We had hoped at one time that a fisheries agreement would be included in the peace treaty, but that was not possible. However, there was included in the treaty a clause which made it incumbent upon Japan to begin discussions with the United States and Canada for a fisheries arrangement. Those discussions have been going on since the treaty was signed. Satisfactory progress has been made and I hope that an announcement in regard to that progress can be made within the next day or two.

The treaty is now ready for ratification. I think it would be wise on our part before it is submitted to Parliament for approval or otherwise, before ratification, to wait and see what happens in Tokyo and Washington, especially in Tokyo where it is now being considered by the Japanese Legislature. It opens a new chapter in our relations with Japan. I hope it will be a happier chapter than that which we have just closed. I think it also opens a new chapter in the security of the Pacific which is just as much a Canadian interest as is the security of the Atlantic.

## Pacific Security Arrangements

It may be asked, indeed, and it has already been asked, "why not try to guarantee peace in the Pacific with a pact as you have tried to guarantee it in the Atlantic?" Within a few hours of signing the Japanese Peace Treaty the United States signed a defence pact with Japan. Recently she signed a defence pact with the Philippines, I think on August 30 last. She signed a security arrangement on September 1 last with New Zealand and Australia. But none of these arrangements, not even the tripartite arrangement which I referred to last, constitute anything like a Pacific pact.

Mr. Truman called the New Zealand-Australia-United States security arrangement a natural initial step in consolidate of peace in the Pacific, and that is what it is. It differs from the North Atlantic pact in another way. The obligation assumed under this tripartite Pacific arrangement is to be found in Article 4 which reads: