

to the stability, security and peace of the area and particularly one which recognizes and precludes the folly of a nuclear arms race.

Let me deal briefly with some of the more important aspects of the Treaty. We think it advantageous that the Treaty should be designed to embrace all sovereign states in the area, although we note that by virtue of Article 25 and an associated resolution relating to territorial disputes, one state in the region and another potential one are at the moment barred from acceding to the Treaty.

The most interesting and indeed ingenious feature, in our view, are clauses under Article 28, which will permit the Treaty to enter into force for those states choosing to waive conditions of prior ratification by all sovereign states in the area, by extra-regional states with dependencies in the area, and by all nuclear powers. We hope that all sovereign states in the area will see fit to accede to the Treaty in the near future. Pending such a development, we hope that the necessary number of states will waive conditions in order to bring the Treaty into force.

We note that nuclear weapon powers and extra-regional states with dependencies in the area are called upon to associate themselves with special protocols to the Treaty. Four of five nuclear powers have made constructive statements of position on the Treaty, as has the Netherlands in respect of its dependencies in the Hemisphere. We hope these statements will add momentum to the current efforts to bring the Treaty effectively into force.

We consider as particularly important those provisions in Articles 12 to 16 which deal with control and verification of the Treaty. They constitute a practical model for other arms control agreements, be they regional or global. They fully and carefully define the scope of the control system and the terms of reference of the treaty organization and of the International Atomic Energy Agency in applying it, so as to ensure that the treaty provisions are being observed by the parties. Of equal significance is the provision for the application of IAEA safeguards to the nuclear activities of the parties by multilateral or bilateral agreement with the agency. This provision promises to lead to further consolidation and extension of the international safeguards system, an objective which Canada earnestly shares.

It is, we believe, unfortunate that there are differences over the interpretation of Articles 5 and 18 as they relate to explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.