

chance of a second invasion in the near to medium term. Surprise attack in particular is not taken seriously as a threat despite the only slowly disappearing memories of the 1982 invasion and occupation. Many Falklanders now know more Argentines than has been the case in the past. As mentioned, Councillors and experts from the islands now frequently form part of British diplomatic delegations and meet Argentine diplomats on a regular basis. Racial stereotypes less often survive the more common travel in South America has now become for many island residents, as well as the many visits currently made by other Latin Americans to the islands. Fishery officials work with and get to know their Argentine counterparts. And while no Argentine citizens are as yet allowed to visit the island on a normal basis, war cemetery visits have occurred and indeed many residents seem to wish them to be placed on a more regular basis.

The place of the Falklands in British official, press and public discourse has returned to a fairly low level as might be expected for a country of Britain's importance and widespread responsibilities. The press rarely deal with the issue except at times such as the recent Menem visit to the UK. The war is now two decades past and few young people seem to know much about it. Indeed, if overseas dependencies seemed a thing of the past in 1982, in 1999 they can seem positively prehistoric to the new generation of Britons.

Military and diplomatic Britain of course takes the matter more seriously. The desire to normalize relations with Argentina is firmly entrenched and has been much reinforced by the relative ease with which CBMs have functioned. There have been incidents, which have at times worried London not to mention Port Stanley. Most of these have been related to fishing activities and all have been kept under control. The general context of Argentine foreign policy has given Whitehall little reason not to have confidence in future relations over the Falklands. Indeed, Britain and Argentina surely share a similar approach to the key question of relations with Washington in the new 'unipolar moment' signalled by many and masterfully discussed by Charles Krauthammer and Marcel Merle.²² What some Argentines have called "self-imposed subordination" has characterized the Argentine foreign policy of the Menem government for reasons already explained and the priority US views enjoy in London is well known to all observers of the British foreign policy scene.

Thus Britain and Argentina have UN voting patterns reflecting a very similar posture on a vast range of international matters, including most in the international security sphere. Their cooperation in peacekeeping is well known and both countries' contributions in the new international context are generally appreciated in Washington. In international financial circles shared positions with the US are the norm if not always the case. On democracy, human rights, economic integration, globalization, free trade, and a large number of other key issues of the post-cold war era, Washington, London and Buenos Aires march to very much the same drum and this makes cooperation and confidence between the last two capitals much easier.

²² The debate on whether the current international context is one of a unipolar *era* or merely a unipolar *moment* is one which has found similar foreign policy interpretations in both London and Buenos Aires. See Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs* 70(1) (1991), pp; 32-3; and Marcel Merle, *La Guerre du Golfe et le nouvel ordre international* (Paris: Economica, 1991).