

abandon its nuclear weapons.⁴²

If that is indeed the case, it raises some sobering prospects. Will the unambiguous achievement of nuclear weapons capability by the North have a spill over effect on the Republic of Korea, Japan or Taiwan? Will the world have to resign itself to living with a united, nuclear Korea in the twenty-first century? Will the achievement of nuclear weapons capability accelerate nuclear proliferation in other parts of the Third World?⁴³

And what does all this say about arms control and inspections? It is difficult to be sanguine when one analyzes the UNSCOM experience in Iraq. Probably at no other time in nuclear history has a country been subject to such investigative scrutiny and yet there is every likelihood that clandestine facilities have not been discovered.⁴⁴ Certainly if the IAEA were to visit the undeclared sites in the North there would still be no way of knowing whether more sites existed elsewhere. At its simplest, the Iraqi and North Korean cases suggest the need to strengthen IAEA authority dramatically. But beyond that is the problem of political will; the willingness to act resolutely early on in the process. Instead, in the North Korean case the Americans and the North Koreans have allowed themselves to become caught up in a process of circular causation in which every delay increases the likelihood that the North is nearer to achieving nuclear weapons capability and that awareness has reduced the number of viable options and given rise to more delay.

One wonders whether the solution to the problem is to abandon carrots and sticks and offer carrots only?⁴⁵ Of course such an approach would give rise to howls of dismay that criminal activity was being rewarded and that the Americans were not capable of acting with