

Even if humanitarian organizations manage, through their activity, to accumulate these resources, Young is still critical of them for lacking one of the resources most important for mediation; leverage with the combatants. Yet this is not always true. Sometimes the relief promised is a form of leverage. Assefa observes that the involvement of the WCC and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) as aid-givers in Sudan dated back to 1965. In their attempt to mediate the conflict they resolved that no aid would be delivered prior to the commencement of negotiations on a permanent settlement.<sup>87</sup> They reasoned that only a political settlement might end the civil war without which the aid would achieve very little.<sup>88</sup> Assefa says that several times during the peace process, the WCC and the AACC seem to have utilized the aid factor as an important incentive for the parties to make peace by making reconciliation a corequisite, if not a prerequisite, for their promises to provide relief.<sup>89</sup> It is not too farfetched to speculate that, in the Khartoum meetings leading to the Plan of Action for OLS, the prospect that aid might be withheld, was a contributing factor in the decision of the Sudanese government to seek peace negotiations with the rebels.

There are even those who argue that leverage is sometimes not a necessary resource for mediation. Yarrow, in fact, argues the opposite. He contends that, in some cases, a mediator's lack of political power might facilitate success rather than hinder it. He says that the credibility of Quaker conciliation was based on its non-political nature, its inability to call down sanctions of any kind: "This enabled them to be accepted and listened to as human beings of integrity by both sides."<sup>90</sup>

Indeed, with civil wars making up a large portion of the armed conflicts being waged today, humanitarian NGOs, rather than governments, may be more appropriate third parties

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<sup>87</sup> Assefa, *supra* note 82, p. 116.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> Yarrow, *supra* note 16, p. 256.