

Reductions in nuclear weaponry, on the other hand, are clearly favoured. Previous Institute polls, as well as the present one, show strong support for a comprehensive test ban treaty, to control or eliminate all testing of these weapons, and for the elimination of at least some of the existing stockpiles.

THE MULRONEY GOVERNMENT'S PLAN ANNOUNCED last spring to reduce future federal spending levels on both foreign aid and defence, met with little public outcry at the time, and the Institute poll suggests a very divided public with few strongly opposing the cuts. One question on the survey noted Ottawa's budget announcement and then asked whether the government should have reduced foreign aid expenditures rather than defence, reduced defence rather than aid, reduced both more, reduced both less, or made other cuts instead (see Figure 4). About one in four Canadians favours reducing defence rather than aid and about as many favour reducing aid rather than defence. Since a slightly higher proportion (29%) also favour greater reductions in both defence and aid, there is thus a slim majority agreeable to at least the announced cuts (if not greater cuts) in both the defence and aid budgets. Slightly more than one-quarter also prefer either lower reductions in both areas or other budget cutting measures instead; this group might be called the "internationalists," given their support for maintaining international activities of both a military and development assistance nature.

Canadians generally are consistent in these preferences. That is to say, those approving cuts in Canada's defence expenditures tend also to favour East-West disarmament, to reject the pursuit of military superiority, to believe that the Cold War is lessening, that "the Soviet threat" has declined, and that economic factors are more important than military factors in determining international influence. On the other hand, those supporting cuts in the aid budget rather than in the defence budget, generally take the opposite views.

Interestingly, the split between these two groups and two perspectives, though real enough, is a secondary one. More fundamental is the cleavage between those who strongly support both types of international activity and those who do not. (The latter group seems to include both those whose concerns are largely budgetary and fiscal, and those who prefer domestic expenditures over external ones.) The depth of this cleavage is shown by the fact that the correlation between supporting (or not) reductions in aid, and supporting reductions in defence, is overall a positive one; that is, more Canadians favour both or neither, than favour either one or the other. Thus a more pervasive debate in Canada than that between a "defence" community and an "aid" community, exists between the "internationalists" and what might be called the "fiscal nationalists."

Another reflection of the broad security perspective of Canadians now, is the extent to which attitudes on continued defence expenditures are related to concerns about the range of international problems discussed earlier. It might be expected, for example,

that those who are "pro-defence" regard the threat of war as serious, but not Third World poverty, abuses of human rights, or trade conflicts. Interestingly enough, it is not so. Those opposing the defence cuts (who tend also to oppose the aid cuts) generally attributed more importance to almost all of the international problems than those who favoured these cuts. The striking differences between Canadians are thus not so much ones between groups with competing international agendas, as between the many who believe there is a broad range of serious external challenges requiring action, and the few who do not.

THE EMERGING ERA, ONE OF EAST-WEST CONCORD rather than merely détente, has already given rise to broader, more encompassing, conceptions of security. While it is difficult to compare directly Canadians' present conceptions of security with those of a generation ago, for lack of data, there is little doubt that these conceptions are very different from those of, say, the 1960s.

Certainly today's conceptions are not fixed in any narrow definition of military security; they comprise

Figure 4: **Reductions to Federal Spending**

	%
Reduce foreign aid rather than defence	24
Reduce defence rather than foreign aid	21
Reduce both more	29
Reduce both less	10
Other	16

not only concerns, generally diminishing, about conventional military threats, but also concerns about the frailty of nuclear deterrence, about economic challenges, and about environmental dangers. They feature perceptions of new, as well as some traditional, threats and recognize the need for common, rather than just national, security in an interdependent world.

Canadians' "new thinking," however, does not abandon traditional policies; instead it incorporates those existing policies that address threats which, while in decline, have not entirely disappeared and probably will not disappear in the foreseeable future. Canadians may not share the "nostalgia for the Cold War" of which the Bush administration was recently accused, but neither have they merely adopted a new set of post-Cold War blinders. □