

*condition* of experience ; or whether again, it be those recent evolutionary systems which allow a certain *quasi* reality to the *a priori* conditions of cognition, but account for these by the law of heredity, which first gathers up and then hands down as an accumulating legacy the results of habit or experience, till in due time these results assume the qualities of necessity and simplicity, empiricism must be carefully guarded against. The great facts and transcendent truths of Christianity pertain to the supersensible world, and the door of cognition must be left open so as to give the human mind access to that region. Any theory of knowledge which shuts that door leaves us out in the bleak, trackless wilds of nescience touching the high truths of religion, and the result will surely be that, even though an irrational and unintelligent faith may hold on to these truths for awhile, that faith may first be perverted, but will finally pass away.

The apologete must also guard against purely idealistic theories of knowledge. Whether it be a thorough-going subjectivism, which admits no sort of knowledge of anything outside of the mind and its various states ; or whether it be a pure phenomenalism, which allows the mind a knowledge of external objects, but asserts that these objects are purely relative and phenomenal, not real and abiding ; or whether, again, it be a constructive idealism, which gives to the objects of knowledge only such objective reality as the act of knowledge itself endows them with, all such theories must be carefully canvassed by the apologete. Any theory which shuts cognition up within the barriers of the subject, or blocks the avenues of objective knowledge, binds consciousness as a helpless prisoner in the castle of solipsism, in whose dreary silent depths he can know neither the world, nor other men, nor God.

The apologete is thus no idle spectator of, but must be an active participant in, the debates now going on in regard to the theory of knowledge. If he capitulates to the empiricist or idealist on the field of psychology, he will be compelled, sooner or later, to surrender to the skeptic or the agnostic in the realm of religion. His first care, therefore, should be to take his stand securely on a sound psychology, which gives a place to the *a priori* element in human knowledge, and regards experience merely as the *occasion*, but not as the *source* of cognition. Such a theory will give abiding reality to the fundamental laws of thought and to