

it without very sufficient cause ; their discretion and moderation have been shewn by the infrequency with which they have resorted to it, as have their firmness and sound judgment, by not shrinking from its use when justly called for.

As for the idle babble about depriving the Court of this power, it is not worth a moment's notice. The idea of committing a power of any kind to any person or number of persons, and then upon the first occasion of its being exercised turning round in great astonishment and great wrath, and depriving them of it, is too ludicrous for discussion ; it can provoke nothing but laughter. To say that it is anomalous that the Court should possess this power, is nothing—the entire government of India is anomalous according to the notions of scholastic legislators. No philosopher in his closet would ever have framed such a plan of government as that to which India is subject, and under which it prospers. It has grown up under the pressure of circumstances, like that of Great Britain, and though widely different in construction, is equally well adapted to answer its purpose. The value of a form of government is to be determined with reference not to symmetrical proportion, but to practical utility. If the Court of Directors are fit to appoint a Governor-General, surely they are fit to decide upon his removal. The two powers seem in common sense to go together. The right of choosing an agent involves the right of dismissing him when he ceases to give satisfaction to his principal.

But there is another consideration. Under the Act 3rd and 4th William IV., cap. 85, the members of the East-India Company gave up a vast amount of property, and suffered another portion to remain at interest, chargeable on the revenues of India, on certain conditions. One of these conditions is, that they shall retain, through their representatives, the Court of Directors, the administration