

existing, and that necessity must be a condition for the stable, and consistent, and intelligent action of a free being. It must stand below him, and he must rule over it, and by the very means of it. But we now pass over into another region of necessity, and, if you please, into what may be called another region of nature. A man may, or may not, make the love of country supreme. That depends upon choice. But if he does that, he *must* have a complacent love for every man into whose face he looks, and who, he knows, has a similar love. This is by necessity, but it is in consequence of choice. And again, let this same man see a traitor, and he must feel moral indignation. He *must* feel it, and will know that he has a right to feel it, and ought to feel it, though it has often been a puzzle to see how that which is thus necessary and spontaneous could be justly commanded, or could be a part of moral character. It is a part of moral character ; nothing more so there is nothing for which we are more fully responsible, and we see how this comes to be.

We may see also that, as the necessity in nature that is before freedom is necessary in order that man may rule over nature ; so also is the necessity after freedom of consequences within himself necessary in order that God may rule over him by any system of natural consequences, or indeed by reward and punishment in any form. If the willful lie or fraud did not necessitate a stain ; if the