

referred to the committee, and that the object of the rule was simply to supersede the necessity of sending the petition, when read, to the Committee on Standing Orders, and send it instead to the Committee on Divorce, which, I think, was a very good change. If my hon. friend will refer to Rule "F," which precedes the one he cited, he will see that the intention of the framer of these rules was that the petition should be received. Now, the petition cannot be received until it is read. Rule "F" says that no petition for divorce should be received after the first thirty days of each Session. You all know that the parliamentary meaning of that term is the reception by the House. Therefore, I contend that this rule requires that the petition should be read and received. Otherwise, the rules would be a jargon. Any gentleman who has given attention to parliamentary proceedings will see at once that it was the intention of the framer of these rules that the petition should be received as well as presented, but what struck me with a great deal of surprise was that my hon. friend completely, though no doubt unintentionally, misrepresented the procedure of the House under these new rules, as I will show, in two at least of the cases to which he has referred. I say that the Journals of the Senate contradict him clearly and emphatically. The hon. gentleman cannot have read the Journals with anything like the care which he generally shows in his citations to the House. These new rules were framed by Senator Gowan, who gave a great deal of attention to the subject and became the first chairman of the Divorce Committee. We all know the legal astuteness and clearness of that hon. gentleman, and the care and circumspection with which he watched every stage of the proceedings in these cases from their initiation under the new rules. I take it for granted that Senator Gowan understood the practice to be pursued under his rules as well as any member of this House, and if any irregularity had occurred he would have corrected it at once. Anyone who knows Senator Gowan does not require to be assured that he would allow no departure from a strict compliance with those rules which he had himself framed, and which he looked upon with the fondness of a father for a cherished bantling. Take the Middleton and Bagwell cases, which

my hon. friend has cited. I am astonished that the hon. gentleman should have referred to these cases. I do not charge him with intentional misrepresentation, but I do charge him with carelessness in making his citations. On page 18 of the Journals I find that the petitions in these two cases were presented on the 6th of February, and on page 21 I find that on the 20th of February they were read and received by the House. The entry is: "Pursuant to the Order of the Day the following petitions were severally read:" and among the petitions mentioned are two of those cited by the hon. gentleman. The argument of my hon. friend is not only destitute of foundation, but it is supported by citations which are incorrect.

HON. MR. DICKEY—As to my hon. friend's complaint that I have been guilty of want of courtesy in not mentioning to him my reason for bringing this up, I have simply to say that I could not find the hon. gentleman. I took the very earliest opportunity to show him the rules, and to give him the notice which courtesy required that I should furnish him. I only looked into the matter this morning, and I then took the very earliest opportunity to speak to him on the subject. My only reason for bringing up the matter now is that I do not want the House to fall into an irregular practice. The hon. gentleman has referred to two cases in which the rule has not been followed. If there were two cases one way, and three cases the other way, of course the majority of precedents would govern.

HON. MR. MILLER—I have not had time to look at the other cases.

HON. MR. DICKEY—Neither have I had time. I made my statement of the cases from what I recollected, and I believe I have mentioned the course that was adopted with regard to the three other petitions; but we are now dealing with the question of what the proper course is in such cases, and I leave the matter entirely to the House.

HON. MR. MILLER—The intention of the rule is simply this: Every hon. member knows that petitions in connection with private Bills are referred, as a matter of course, without motion, to the Committee on Standing Orders. The intention