

*Military Equipment Export Restrictions*

for example, high precision metal working equipment, high performance computer and telecommunication equipment, encryption equipment, strategic metals and compounds, for example, elemental boron, fluoro-carbon compounds, monocrystalline gallium compounds, also lasers, super thin films, aviation location finding equipment as well as munitions and military supplies and atomic energy materials.

Because controls on strategic and military exports to the Warsaw Pact countries and China are co-ordinated multilaterally within COCOM, Canada's policy in this area is in general accord with the policies of most other western countries. The impact of our controls is, moreover, enhanced by their integration into a multilateral arrangement. This approach has well served Canada's national security, commercial and broad foreign policy interests.

Experience over recent years led the Government to conclude, in the context of the policy review on military exports, that its restrictive policy with respect to military goods exports should not apply equally to the export of strategic goods. Civilian industrial goods are on the export control list as a result of Canada's participation in COCOM. As mentioned earlier, the COCOM controls apply only to exports to certain proscribed destinations which are considered to be potential adversaries. Although there can be no question that exports of all strategic and military goods must be broadly controlled to prevent their diversion to these proscribed destinations, the Government has decided that Canada's policy should more closely conform to the practice of our major trading partners, and particularly those of COCOM members.

For this reason, the policy announcement of September 10, 1986, focused on the export of military goods, particularly to countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities, or to countries with persistent records of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens. On the other hand, strategic goods are not seen by the international community as part of the arms trade. It is generally recognized that Governments or private enterprises continue to have legitimate civilian requirements for goods such as telecommunications equipment and advanced computers.

Two special circumstances affect policy toward the export of strategic goods. The first area of concern is national security, and reflects the threat of diversion of strategic goods to the proscribed destinations. The second area of concern is foreign policy, and reflects the Government's abhorrence of the apartheid system in the Republic of South Africa. In this latter instance, exports of military goods and technology are denied to all consignees in that country in recognition of the obligations which Canada assumed in light of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (1977) 418.

The Government has gone one step further with respect to commitments made in the Commonwealth Accord of Nassau of October, 1985, in prohibiting the export of strategic goods to Departments and agencies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. The cost has been a real one to many Canadians. The Government has refused a number of

permits for high technology civilian strategic goods in relation to multimillion dollar contracts where Canadian expertise has been recognized not only in South Africa but also world-wide, not only in South Africa but also world-wide. These permit denials reflect our ongoing commitment to seeking peaceful political change in South Africa.

Just last evening, the Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney) announced a plan to have the seven major industrialized countries form an eminent persons group to conduct constructive discussions with the leaders of South Africa with the objective of dismantling apartheid in a peaceful, non-violent manner.

Some Canadians believe that Government does not restrict the export of a wide enough range of goods. Other Canadians equally firmly believe that the Government controls the export of far too many goods. This argument finds vocal expression, for example, in the case of exports of goods used by military and paramilitary organizations in countries with a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens. While this is a difficult issue to resolve, the conclusion reached reflects the Government's belief in the right of nations to defend themselves against external aggression. What is objectionable in the case of exports of military goods to such countries is that this equipment is turned and used against civilians within the country. Therefore, in his policy statement, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Clark) announced that the Government was prepared to consider export permits for military goods to such countries only where there is no reasonable risk that the goods would be used against the civilian population.

Approvals of permit applications which fall within this guideline will not be easily reached. Members may be assured that any permit application will be most carefully scrutinized by the Secretary of State for External Affairs himself only after compelling arguments will have been put forward by this prospective exporter that there is no reasonable risk that the goods would be used against the civilian population. Most applications will, therefore, be denied. I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for the opportunity to participate in this debate.

**Mrs. Pauline Browes (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of the Environment):** Mr. Speaker, this afternoon members have had an opportunity to learn about the various aspects of the export control policy of the Government as it applies particularly to the military exports. Indeed, it will come as no surprise to members to learn that in addition to a complex system which processes and reviews applications from Canadian manufacturers and exporters of military goods or of highly sensitive strategic goods, there is an equally complex system to track the movement of control goods both before and subsequent to their export from Canada. This particular issue was raised recently by one member who was expressing some concern about the possibility of Canadian origin military equipment being used in a regional conflict in spite of, or contrary to, Canadian policy in this regard.