information in respect of which protection from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national interest is classified for security purposes, and that this information is effectively protected.

[*Translation*]

Second, we want to reduce the number of positions in the Government of Canada that require the incumbent to be security screened.

[*English*]

Third, we want to better protect the rights of individuals affected by the Government's administrative security system.

[*Translation*]

And fourth, we want to upgrade the security of Canada by more effectively managing the resources dedicated to the security screening and information classification and protection programs.

[*English*]

Under the new policy, information will only be security classified if it falls into one of six areas: national defence; international affairs; national security, including hostile and subversive activities and threats to the country's security; confidences of Cabinet; federal-provincial affairs; and selected economic interests of Canada. I want to underline that in no way will this new classification system have any effect whatsoever on a person's right to access under the access and privacy legislation.

To reduce the number of positions which require the incumbent to be security screened, the test will be whether an individual has regular and consistent access to classified information as part of his or her official duties. The level of security clearance will be tied directly to the degree of injury the incumbent or contractor could cause if he disclosed information or material assets classified in the national interest.

Based on the degree of injury there will be three levels of security clearance. I believe the vast majority of classified information can be held in the first level, the lowest level. Much tighter control than is now the case will be exercised on the information placed in secret and top secret categories, therefore reducing the necessity for higher level clearances.

[*Translation*]

The criteria to be used in rejecting a candidate for a security clearance must be up-dated and made more equitable. Security investigations must also be done in a completely fair and defensible fashion and with the consent of the applicants, ensuring that the rights of any individual subject to security screening are upheld.

[*English*]

Our security screening criteria will be brought fully into line with the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. The Government has redefined the rejection criteria so that to be rejected on grounds of disloyality there must be reasonable grounds to believe that individuals are engaged in or may engage in activities which fall within the definition of a "threat to the security of Canada." Under CD 35 a person could be rejected if considered unreliable, not because he is disloyal. This is no longer supportable. Under the new policy, doubts concerning an individual's reliability must be linked to loyality for the employer to reject a candidate for a security clearance. The employer must have reasonable grounds to believe that a person is unreliable.

I want to emphasize to the House that I will soon issue a formal directive to CSIS governing the provision of security assessments which will give the Service detailed guidelines on how the Government expects the new security policies to be put into action. Under my new directive, CSIS may not conduct any security clearance investigation for a department or agency unless the written consent of the individual is first obtained. I will also direct that CSIS conduct all investigations for security clearance purposes in a manner consistent with this consent by the individual and the principles of natural justice, including obtaining consent for the recording of any interviews. CSIS may interview individuals in order to give them an opportunity to resolve any security concerns which might have arisen in the course of the investigation.

[*Translation*]

I also reaffirm the Government's commitment to a fair and equitable review procedure for those denied security clearance. Under the CSIS Act, the Deputy Head must notify any person denied a security clearance within ten days and of their right to complain to the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

[*English*]

The CIRC has demonstrated its value as a review mechanism by the careful, thorough and fair manner in which it has investigated and reported upon those cases which have so far come before it, and the way in which it has brought the principles of natural justice into play in those cases.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Speaker, to direct this new system effectively, the Government has charged Treasury Board with responsibility for the overall management of the new policies. The Treasury Board will assist each department in implementation of the program and monitor compliance with it. CSIS will maintain a central index of all security clearances to assist the Treasury Board and the deparments in the management of the screening program.

[*English*]

The new policies I have announced today are based on two requirements: the need for more responsible management of the Government's security system to improve national security; and the need for a fairer and more equitable treatment of public servants and others who do business with the Government.

Mr. John Nunziata (York South—Weston): Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the Solicitor