And we could not make that perfectly clear because we did not admit that contention in the settlement that was made. The proposed increases to the seaway employees were recommended to the government by a government industrial inquiry commissioner, Senator MacKenzie, who also recommended them to the unions. The government did not impose that settlement. It accepted a recommendation of its mediator, which it had judged to be a fair and reasonable one.

Now, Mr. Speaker, the charge that I have been dealing with was that government intervention in the longshoremen's dispute was responsible for the wage demands made in these recent negotiations, and I want to make one further important point in this connection. It is that when the Minister of Labour (Mr. Nicholson) intervened in the dispute between the International Longshoremen's Association and the Shipping Federation of Canada on the night of June 11 and June 12, all the matters in dispute at that time had been agreed on by the parties except three, and these three did not concern wages.

One was a provision for a four hour guarantee for each recall of gangs, similar to the guarantee for initial call; the second was overtime of 40 cents an hour commencing January 1, 1966, and the third concerned arrangements for calling members of gangs over the week end for early Monday morning.

When I was called in on January 13 point No. 3 had been cleared away, and the only points which remained for settlement, although they were sticky points, were the first two points I have mentioned, and did not concern hourly wage figures at all. Those had previously been agreed upon. Agreement was reached on these last two points by the I.L.A. accepting the application of the 40 cent increase to all hourly work since January, 1966, regular or overtime, and the shipping federation accepting the four hour guarantee on recall of gangs on the understanding that this matter would be studied by the commission of inquiry which was to be set up.

• (8:40 p.m.)

So, far from imposing a wage level on that particular negotiation, that wage level had been agreed on by the two parties before the government was called in to clear up the remaining three points which did not concern wage levels. I have been waiting for some time to make that point clear.

Now, there was a good deal of talk this afternoon about and, understandably, there will be a good deal of consideration given to the matter of job security in the bill which we are now considering, and perhaps in the subsequent legislation dealing with the railways. This legislation I believe was considered by the five boards to be one of primary importance. On the Munroe board, the union representative asked for a work stablilization agreement with a job security fund. The chairman, Judge Munroe, thought more use should be made of the job security fund which was established following the 1962 negotiations, and which provided for protection for long service employees. He also pointed out that conditions have been improved by recently enacted legislation regarding training and assistance to displaced workers.

The report of Judge Little's two boards dealt with job security at greater length than it dealt with some of the other matters referred to. These two reports, which are in identical terms, in so far as this matter is concerned, are in almost identical terms to certain conclusions of the Freedman report in respect of the successful mediation of current disputes, and disputes in the future.

According to Judge Little's boards—and these are reports signed by all three members of the boards—there were three basic principles involved, in addition to the question of job security. The first question was the railways right, on due notice to the union, to determine and effect technological innovations, both major and minor, where the rights of employees might be adversely effected. The second question was negotiation between the union and the railway of the protective conditions to apply to each and every employee affected in each case. The third point was the *modus operandi* of resolving such protective conditions in the absence of mutual agreement. The union and railway representatives who appeared before these two boards agreed on one and two above.

I think it is of very great significance that on a board of this kind the railway representative did agree—as he did—to points one and two, and point two deals with negotiation between the union and the railway of the protective conditions to apply to each and every employee affected in each case. They recognize the right of negotiation in changes of this kind. They were not able, however, to agree on point three which dealt with what should be done if they could not reach agreement.