

on the other hand it would retain and strengthen public opinion behind the United Nations.

One of the things which has been emphasized with the greatest force in the sudden developments of Saturday last is that those nations which hope to preserve their freedom must have defence forces in being, as was indicated only a few weeks ago by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. There is general agreement that the only hope of preserving peace is that the nations which are joined for the defence of freedom shall be able to act whenever freedom is threatened. Korea is not covered by the Atlantic pact; nevertheless Korea is a direct responsibility of the United Nations, within the framework of which the community of Atlantic nations has been carrying forward its efforts to preserve peace. Today there are no little nations far away. Today Korea is closer to us in terms of transportation time, in terms of information which can be flashed by wireless and by cable, and in terms of direct impact upon our own future, than was Poland in September, 1939. At that time there was no direct access to Poland by the western allies. There was little direct communication; there was in fact no way in which the western nations could exercise any direct and immediate influence upon the course of events in Poland in September, 1939.

Today it is impressed upon all of us that what we are considering when we examine the estimates of the Department of National Defence is survival in a world in which war is becoming a matter of obliteration. Therefore the first consideration that should be in our minds in examining these estimates is the results that are to be produced by these estimates in terms of armed forces in being, ready to go into action should such a dreadful necessity arise. There is no reason why any hon. member of this house should back away from the recognition of the fact that the only way we can preserve peace, the only way we can prevent such occurrences as are taking place today in Korea and are taking place in so many other countries in the past few years, is for Canada and other nations in the Atlantic community to demonstrate clearly to the aggressors in the Kremlin that we are ready. We should demonstrate that any move on their part against us, or against any one of the member nations, can be dealt with by an armed force that is ready to be used. That is the test, and it is upon that basis that we have expressed our hope that peace can be preserved. The first question that we should ask ourselves in examining these estimates, which are lumped substantially in a single

item, No. 202, is what armed forces in being are to result from the money that is to be spent.

We know that Russia is working by every device in her power for revolution in countries that are believed to be ripe for revolution, and seeking to pave the way for revolution in countries where that might not seem an immediate prospect, as in Canada, but where it is believed that at some distant date it may become an immediate possibility. The Russians are also working for the destruction of our economic system by such trade arrangements as will undermine our trading arrangements; by the depression of prices which will interfere with the strength of our economy generally, and by the disruption of our economic structure internally through infiltration into particular fields of our economic and social life. We have been seeing a new kind of war. We talk of cold wars and hot wars, but they are all wars of aggression. The Russians have demonstrated that the first stage can be just as effective in reaching their objectives as the second stage. Undoubtedly they will delay the employment of any overt acts within that second stage as long as they are meeting with success in the first stage.

It would appear that the attack in Korea on Saturday does suggest the possibility that they are ready to contemplate entering the second stage. No thoughtful person can be in any doubt that the government of northern Korea did not launch that attack without the full authority of the Kremlin, without the advice of the Kremlin, and without military assistance from their general staff. Therefore we must examine these events, and the implication of the seriousness that they convey to us of possible changes in policy at the Kremlin. The year 1950 may well be the most significant and critical one in the history of modern man; it may well decide whether all the hopes of those who met at San Francisco five years ago this spring are to turn to ashes, or whether they are to reach vigorous and effective fulfilment as a result of action taken by the United Nations at this time.

The estimates before us cover 1950 and the first months of 1951. We therefore examine them in relation to these events and with the perspective which they give to everything that may result from the expenditure of the money we are now being asked to supply to the Department of National Defence. No one should hesitate to examine the present situation in terms of the most exact reality. No one should hesitate to examine our situation in this country, which is one of the