

purpose of the United Nations military action in Korea. When communism, or indeed fascism, results in acts of military aggression, that aggression should be met by any form of collective action, including military collective action, which can be made effective. But the purpose of such action is to defeat aggression. Communism itself, as a reactionary and debasing doctrine, must be fought on other planes and in different ways; by the use of economic, social, political and moral weapons. As Sir Norman Angell put it in a letter to the New York Times the other day:

"The vital distinctions in this matter are not difficult or very obscure. We can overcome, and still better, deter, military aggression with military force ... But if we use military power to dictate or to appear to dictate to other nations, Asiatic or European, what social or political or economic system they may adopt for themselves, we shall awaken a nationalism which in the end will defeat us."

Since the United Nations objective in Korea, then, is to defeat aggression, it follows, I think, that the methods used should be designed to limit and localize the conflict and not to spread it. As long ago as August 31, 1950, I said in this house that it was not the purpose of this government to support any course of policy which would extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea, a conflict which should be confined and localized if it is in our power to do that; also that United Nations policy should be to avoid giving anyone else an excuse for extending the conflict. ... That is still our view.

One way by which the conflict could be spread would be by authorizing the United Nations commander in Korea to conduct aerial bombing of China. As I said on April 26 last in the house, it is possible to visualize a situation in which immediate retaliatory action without prior consultation might be unavoidable in pursuing enemy bombers back to, and in attempting to destroy, the Manchurian air bases from which they came. It is our view, however, that the bombing, as well as the blockading, of China should, if at all possible be avoided, since such action would involve grave risk of extending the fighting without, as we see it, any corresponding assurance that such extension would end the war. The history, the position, the social and economic organization, and the political situation in China would not seem to give much hope for any such decisive result from such limited action. Indeed, it may be felt, on the contrary, that this limited action which has been suggested would inevitably develop into unlimited action against China, about the possible result of which the Japanese perhaps are best fitted to give testimony. One result we can, however, expect with some certainty, and that is great satisfaction in Moscow over such a development. It may be that the Chinese communists, by indulging in massive air activity over Korea, will make some kind of retaliation necessary. They have, however, not yet taken such action, and in that sense have not yet conducted an all-out war against the United Nations forces in Korea. As General Bradley put it in an address in Chicago on April 17:

"Communist air intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date. Neither has it been any serious threat to our air force."