- (d) mutually satisfactory notification and material reporting procedures should be in place between the Parties;
- (e) a description of the current and planned nuclear energy programme including in particular a detailed description of the policy, legal and regulatory elements relevant to reprocessing and plutonium storage and use should be provided by the Party envisaging such activities;
- (f) the Parties should agree to periodic and timely consultations at which, inter alia, the information provided under guideline (e) above would be updated and significant changes in the nuclear energy programme would receive the fullest possible consideration;
- (g) reprocessing and plutonium storage and use should only take place when the information provided on the nuclear energy programme of the Party in question has been received, when the undertakings, arrangements and other information called for by the guidelines are in place or have been received and when the Parties have agreed that the reprocessing and plutonium storage and use are an integral part of the described nuclear energy programme;
- (h) reprocessing and plutonium storage and use should only take place so long as the commitment of the Party in question to non-proliferation does not change and so long as the commitment to periodic and timely consultations referred to in guideline (f) is honoured.

3. I note that Canada and Finland are agreed that the objectives of the above guidelines have been accepted by our two Governments.

4. I further note that Finland has made an effective commitment to nonproliferation and has submitted all relevant material to IAEA safeguards and to adequate physical protection measures. I also note that Finland has provided to Canada the description of its current and planned nuclear energy programme, that Canada and Finland have agreed that reprocessing and plutonium storage and use are an integral part of that programme and that the notification and material reporting procedures are in place.

5. Finally, I note that these arrangements, inter alia, take into account the results of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation studies in relation to the operations in question. Further, I note that the Parties acknowledge that the separation, storage, transportation and use of plutonium require specific measures to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation; are determined to continue to support the development of international safeguards and other non-proliferation measures relevant to reprocessing and plutonium, including an effective and generally accepted international plutonium storage scheme; and recognize the role of reprocessing in the context of significant nuclear energy programmes as it relates to the maximum use of available resources the management of materials contained in spent fuel, or other peaceful non-explosive purposes including research.