

in this field should contain effective provisions for verification. Other delegations stressed the importance of issues such as the identification of the threats to which space objects are confronted, the relationship between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and other areas of disarmament and the problem of verification.

B. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space

14. There was general recognition that, as provided for in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

15. Some delegations underlined the central role that the Charter of the United Nations plays in the legal régime applicable to outer space. In that connection, they stressed the special significance of the Charter provisions on the non-use of force -- Articles 2(4) and 51 -- which, taken together, prohibit any act of aggression in outer space. Accordingly, they believed that these provisions afforded a substantial degree of protection to space objects. Other delegations reaffirmed the importance of the United Nations Charter, but, at the same time, reiterated that its provisions concerning the non-use of force could not, in and of themselves, be sufficient to preclude an arms race in outer space -- just as they had not done so on Earth -- since they did not address the question of the development, testing, production and deployment of weapons in space. For example, these delegations recalled that the legal provisions of these articles had not prevented the arms race on Earth, nor did they diminish the universally recognized need to negotiate disarmament agreements and even to ban specific types or whole classes of weapons, such as biological, nuclear, chemical, radiological weapons. In their view Article 51 of the Charter could not be interpreted as justifying the use of space weapons for any purposes or the possession of any type of arms based on the use of space weapons. They also stressed that Article 51 could not be invoked to legitimize the use or threat of use of force in or from outer space. In this context, they noted that the objective agreed upon by consensus, both at multilateral and bilateral levels, was not to regulate an arms race in outer space but to prevent it, and that any attempt to justify the introduction of weapons in that environment contradicted that objective. Accordingly, these delegations believed that in the context of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee the value of statements on the existing degree of protection to space objects should be assessed against their relevance to the achievement of the common objective to prevent an arms race in outer space.

16. Delegations examined various multilateral and bilateral instruments, inter alia, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1971), the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of