

## Chapter Five

### Defining Confidence-Building Measures

Thus far in this study, we have looked briefly at Confidence-Building Measures from an historical perspective. From that perspective, we have encountered a considerable variety of illustrations: international arms control agreements that function as CBMs; the Helsinki Final Act's CBMs; and the Associated Measures of the MBFR negotiations. First, we saw that any number of international agreements either contain or are themselves CBMs. This is particularly evident if we use a deliberately general definition of the CBM concept as the basis for deciding whether or not an agreement is a CBM. For instance, if we say that a Confidence-Building Measure is a bilateral or multilateral undertaking (perhaps as formal as a treaty, perhaps quite informal) intended to clarify adversary intentions, to reduce uncertainties and to constrain the opportunities for surprise attack, then at least half the agreements listed in Chapter Two are CBMs.<sup>20</sup> This is certainly true of all the so-called "Hot Line" agreements (the American, British and French arrangements with the Soviet Union). It is obviously the case for the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (the United States and the Soviet Union) as well as agreements on the prevention of accidental nuclear war (both France and Britain with the Soviet Union). A number of naval arms control agreements are CBMs (for instance, the Rush-Bagot Treaty, the Chilean-Argentine treaty, the Greco-Turkish treaty, the 1936 London Naval Treaty and some Black Sea agreements). The Spitsbergen and the Aaland Island non-fortification agreements are certainly good examples, as well. The ABM Treaty is clearly an example (an uncertainty reducer of the first order) as is the associated memorandum of understanding establishing the Standing Consultative Commission. The agreement not to interfere with national technical means of verification (in the SALT I Interim Agreement) is undeniably a Confidence-Building Measure. A reasonable argument can also be made for the consideration of all denucleari-

zation and demilitarization treaties and for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We could also include proposals that, while never actually adopted, still constituted CBMs. The 1930 Draft Convention of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the 1955 "Open Skies" proposal, schemes mentioned at the 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference and the Rapacki Plans all contain clear-cut CBMs. Without using deliberately restrictive criteria, all of these undertakings appear to qualify as reasonable CBM examples.

Despite the fact that these examples appear to match the *function* of a Confidence-Building Measure, some analysts might complain that this is too generous an understanding of the CBM concept. For instance, if all of these agreements are CBMs, then the presumed and often stated distinction *between* CBMs and arms control agreements appears unwarranted and insupportable. This very generous interpretation certainly seems broad to a fault when contrasted with the Helsinki CBMs. The Final Act of the CSCE specified a very precise collection of measures which many people associate exclusively with the term CBM. This may be *too* narrow, however. After all, the Helsinki CBMs are voluntary, very modest in scope and constitute but two, restrictive applications: pre-notification of large military manoeuvres (as distinct from "movements") and the invitation of observers to manoeuvres. Although most analysts and practitioners recognize that these are but tentative initial steps, the tendency is still to associate the concept exclusively with the Helsinki application.

The Associated Measures outlined in the 1979 NATO proposal at the Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR) also suggest a relatively restrictive set of measures. There, the "Associated Measures" embraced more thorough (and compulsory) notification regulations for manoeuvres *and* movements, especially those involving the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the use of inspectors to monitor the movement of forces into and out of the sensitive reduction zone, a fixed number of inspection trips into or over the reduction zone, the periodic exchange of information and data on forces, the creation of an "implementation and complaint" commission and an agreement not to interfere with each others' National

<sup>20</sup> This is by no means a misleading or "straw man" "definition". As we will soon see, it combines the elements present in the majority of analytic and substantive definitions. The multi-faceted character of the definition is an accurate reflection of the distinctive directions taken by different CBM explanations.

