

who did not attempt to ride over it at a gallop. The manoeuvre just described was only carried out by the first line, the second remaining stationary, until the first by changing front half left on the left battalion of right brigade reassumed its original relation to the second line, when the latter merely moved up into proper distance. The division next advanced in double mass from the centre, an imposing evolution carried out with more minute accuracy, although a somewhat long time elapsed between its being ordered and its being executed. There are Colonels, to get into whose heads an order not of the simplest character, seems to require a process of the character reputed as needful to get a joke into a Scotchman's head. But slow and sure, is better than flashily quick and wrong. The division advanced some distance in this formation, and then retired, the Horse Artillery advancing from the right at a trot up the steep and rugged ground, to cover what as the result of an interim change of front on the part of the division, was now the right flank. The battery took to the rough ground with great determination, but there is ground too rough even for British artillery. One of the guns capsized, while the remainder unlimbered and came to action front; but the gunners were all engaged in righting the upset gun, which was speedily effected. The 7th Hussars went out in skirmishing order to cover the new front while the division advanced. Nothing could have been finer than the dash with which the 4th and 60th on the right of the first line of the division reconnoitred a dense tract of high furze, and the adroitness with which the regiment picked up its formation after the inevitable disrapture of its ranks spoke volunms for the pains taken in its drill. The Hussars having been recalled, the Bays went out on the hill to cover the rear as the division retired to its original position. The splendid regiment went out in troops at a hand canter, without a single mishap, over some atrocious ground. Then alternate troops broke into skirmishing order, while alternate troops remained behind as reserves. The skirmishers of the Bays went to the front as if each man had a couple of spare necks in his wallet; but so well did they ride that there was no occasion for a man to draw on his reserve. On the brigade halting nearly on the ground on which it had formed up on the march, the Bays were recalled, arms were piled, belts taken off, and fatigue parties despatched to the camp kitchens on the knoll by the wood to bring up the dinners. The men carried biscuits in their haversacks; the Control sent out the meat and distributed it on the field.

At 2.30 the manoeuvres were renewed, this time as a sham fight. The 9th Lancers three guns Royal Horse Artillery, under Colonel Williams, the Dorset and the Hants Volunteers, under Colonel Addington, were sent as an enemy over the brow of the high ridge of Bridger's Hill. The first line of the defending force under General Brownrigg consisted of 4th 60th, Elthorne Militia; 100th Regiment, 17th and Wilts, 19th Surrey, 22nd A, 14th Battery, Royal Artillery; and H, 11th Battery, Royal Artillery. The second line consisted of the 102nd, the Royal London Militia, 94th, 1st and 2nd Surrey, 82nd, and three guns Royal Horse Artillery on left flank. On the right flank of both lines were the Bays and the 7th Hussars. The front line advanced in quarter distance columns covered by 60th and 100th as supports, and deployed, the rear line forming mass of columns in two demi-brigades. The enemy's guns opened on the

right flank, and skirmishers were seen on the hill pressing on to the attack. A Field Battery of Artillery moved to the left rear, and, gaining the edge of a wood on some rising ground, replied to the enemy's fire from this commanding position; while the defence hurried out skirmishers. The second line having opened out to deploying distance, a change of front was effected half-right from right of brigades on right battalion (60th); the Bays and 7th Hussars formed columns of troops. The defending skirmishers, having felt the enemy, opened a vigorous fire all along the line; a sharp reply coming from the enemy's skirmishers. The defenders' skirmishers fell back firing, torn by the enemy's artillery on the right flank of the attack. The left, being pressed by the enemy, was opportunely strengthened from the second rank. The recall suddenly sounded, the skirmishers scuttled in (the 60th showing wonderful smartness), and the defence advanced into échelon of battalions from the left, the échelon advancing from the left covered by skirmishers on the left and left centre. The enemy's skirmishers held a strong position in the gorse, and his guns pounded heavily the right of the defence, and partly enfiladed its line. The line of the defence halted, and an independent and volley firing was commenced at 200 yards distance. The Bays and Hussars formed two lines in rear of right battalion. The defence was, however, forced still to retreat, its baggage having, in anticipation of this necessity, already moved off by the road the advance had been made. The troops followed the baggage, and the enemy may be considered to have won the day. The division did not return to camp until after 6 p.m., after ten hours' work."

Speaking of the operations generally, the *Standard* observes that the Staff worked steadily, unceasingly, and in quiet business-like manner, which is a great improvement on the traditional purposes dash and flash of the British cocked hat. The Engineers preceded the division by two days, and the result of their labour in improving the communications, by laying down turf and branches on soft ground, filling up ruts, &c., was everywhere visible. Fortunately, the day was fine, otherwise not all their exertions could have hindered the wagons from experiencing great difficulty in passing over the boggy ground which extended along a great part of the front of the camp. The retreat would appear to have been covered skillfully, and in due conformity with the rules of war, by the 2nd Brigade. The extreme rearguard was furnished by 1st Battalion 4th Regiment, who extended two companies in skirmishing order, said skirmishers passing through fields and enclosures, except where serious damage would have resulted from their passage, just as if a real enemy had been at their heels. Close in front, that is to say between the skirmishers and the rest of the column, was a troop of cavalry. The cavalry were freely used indeed throughout the day, but it seemed to us that their activity and energy were not properly directed. One glaring defect in the arrangements for the outposts was that they were left at a long distance from the main body, without proper means of communicating with it, and without due support. As a whole, however, the day's work was an immense improvement on that which has hitherto taken place, owing perhaps in some measure to the presence of the Duke of Cambridge. It is, however, only fair to ascribe the merit to Sir Hope Grant himself, who certainly handled his division better than the officer commanding the force at Hartford Bridge Flats.

FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL ITEMS.

Great activity continues to be displayed in the production of artillery in France. In the Loire district the cannon foundries are very busily employed. Some breech loading cannon, upon a system introduced by Colonel Reffye, have been successfully submitted to very severe tests. Some of the cannon made of late, have a range of 3-4 miles.

When all the works of construction and repair are finished, the German navy will comprise seven iron-clads with an aggregate of 4,800 horse power, and carrying 77 guns: one vessel of the line (steam), five corvettes (steam), seven despatch boats (steam), twenty-two gun boats (steam), one transport, (steam), one training brig, three other brigs, three frigates, and a ship used as a floating barrack. All these vessels, taken together and adding the iron clads, carry between them an aggregate of 532 guns.

Referring to the rolling experienced in the British iron clads during the recent cruise of the combined squadrons, the *London Standard* asks what compensation would there be for the loss of fighting power occasioned by half the fleet being unable, on account of the weather, to use its guns, and when the fight was over being, from the same cause, barely able to keep the sea? It is, of course, possible that the iron-clad navies of neighboring countries may possess similar properties. Things being thus equalized, we should, in the event of war, feel no apprehension as to the result. But the reverse might prove to be the case; and it is evident that an admiral who knows that his ships can be trusted to fight in all weathers must possess an enormous advantage over one who is conscious that after the wind has obtained a certain force, half the ships in his fleet are likely to inflict more injury upon their own crews than upon the enemy. In saying so we desire to exhibit no desponding spirit. That iron-clads can be built to sit the water steadily even when it is blowing a gale is evident, since the *Monarch*, whose rigging is exceptionally heavy, only rolled at the outside fifteen degrees through the arc, to the *Lord Warden's* sixty-two degrees.

"Send me men, not boys," wrote the great Napoleon on one occasion, when he required more soldiers in his Italian campaign. So quotes the *Broad Arrow*, and goes on to apply the remark thus: "He had found from experience that the youthful conscripts could not bear the fatigue and privations of war. The raw levies and volunteers who endured such hardships and privations under Dumouriez were men, not boys. The experience of our Indian Army exemplifies in a remarkable manner the importance of sending to our Eastern Empire the full-grown and knit man. The *Pioneer* furnishes us with the following facts in illustration: In January, 1870, a draft composed of one officer, one sergeant, two corporals, and sixty-eight privates arrived at Thayetmyo, Burmah, from England, for the right wing of the Seventy-sixth regiment. Their average age was twenty years and twenty-three days. From January to November, 1870, there were of this number eight admissions to the hospital; eighteen men of this draft were sent to India for change, nine died—eight from cholera and its effects. Of the eighteen men who were sent to India for change not one exceeded twenty-one years of age, and the ages of those who died of cholera did not exceed twenty."