have been unable to find anything distinctly bearing on this question of constitutional power, but in Mr. Forsyth's work on Constitutional Law (Forsyth's Constitutional Law, p. 1[illegible]) he states that this identical point arose with reference to the power of the Indian legislature to pass laws binding on native subjects out of India, and came before the law officers of the Crown, and himself in 1867, . . . and they all, with the exception of the Advocate-General, Sir R. Phillimore, thought that, 'as the extent of the powers of the legislature of India depended upon the authority conferred upon it by Acts of Parliament,' it was unsafe to hold that the Indian legislature had power to pass such laws."

Although not called upon, as he said, to decide this question, yet Mr. Justice Strong did, in some sense, decide it by using the conclusion that such a law was *ultra vires* to strengthen the presumption that the law in question in this case was to be understood, in the absence of express language to the contrary, to be intended to be restricted in its operation to the Dominion.

Henry, J., at p. 600, says: "I cannot come to the conclusion that the legislature intended a party guilty of fraud in any other country . . . to be imprisoned here for fraud committed in some other country, and not against any subjects of the Dominion. . . . Further than that, I doubt that the constitutional rights of the Parliament would not go as far as to pass an Act, under the peculiar circumstances of this country, to punish a party for fraud committed outside of the Dominion."

Taschereau, J., at p. 600: "I doubt very much if the Parliament of Canada would have the power to legislate at all on the dealings or actions which have taken place outside of Canada."

But the highest authority on this question is the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: *McLeod* v. *Attorney-General of New South Wales*, (1891) A.C. 455. In delivering the judgment of the court in this case, Lord Halsbury, L.C., says: "Upon the face of this record the offence is charged to have been committed in Missouri, in the United States of America, and it, therefore, appears to their lordships that it is manifestly shown, beyond all possibility of doubt, that the offence charged was an offence which, if committed at all, was committed in another country, beyond the jurisdiction of New South Wales. The result, as it appears to their lordships, must be that there