

the violation of a treaty, the raiding of a "Corridor", and the relation of certain Articles of the Covenant to such performances. The Manchurian imbroglio should surely incite us to think the whole problem over again.

The response I have seemed to receive from Canadian Club audiences, etc. to my appeal on behalf of the ideal of a powerful rather than of a powerless League, leads me to wonder whether the time be ripe for a change of our official attitude on that point.

In this letter, as in my speeches, I express only my own views. There is no "Geneva attitude" on this vital issue. The International Labour Office is occupied with social problems; and I discuss high politics as a Canadian observer rather than as an I.L.O. official.

In conclusion, dear Sir Arthur, I make bold to predict that our delegates to the Disarmament Conference will accomplish nothing worth while unless they have authority to meet the "Security thesis" half way. We cannot have something for nothing; we must offer a quid pro quo. Nobody is asking us to disarm further. When we importune others on that point, they invariably reply, "Then will you stand by us?" Thereupon we run to cover. It is a futile game. Surely the Manchurian mess will teach Canada that the world is in desperate need of a League with power, of a Council with authority, and of a Covenant rejuvenated and strengthened and freed from successive and regrettable emasculations.

Pardon me for writing you at such length. I am even enclosing a copy of one of my speeches, which you must not feel bound to read. On October 19, out of the kindness of your heart,