

Supply—Health and Welfare

lems requiring careful analysis and intensive leadership by civil authorities in each of the target areas.

The fact that evacuation is difficult or inconvenient, however, does not detract from the equally evident fact that we must have planned evacuation or millions of North Americans will die unnecessarily in the event of attack.

On that same platform that same day appeared the Minister of National Health and Welfare. The closest approximation to even a suggestion that mass evacuation of cities was a primary consideration in civil defence in Canada I find in his speech when he says:

Consideration will have to be given to the strategic and tactical deployment of civil defence forces. This means that, when the early warning is given, the civil defence workers might be pulled out to the periphery of the city so that they would be ready to move back in to carry out their essential rescue work once the bomb had been dropped.

In other words even at that point, one year after the United States had commenced talking and planning and working for mass evacuation, the department here in Canada had not faced up to this situation or taken any concrete steps to meet it. In fact they were not even thinking, according to the minister's speech, in terms of mass evacuation of cities. We find General Worthington saying essentially the same thing on the same platform on the same day. General Worthington said:

The advent of the so-called hydrogen bomb has made it necessary to make a new assessment. Virtually the whole of Canada has now become a target area, with a number of critical or potential aiming points, but every town, village and hamlet will have a part to play and it is of vital importance that there be an organization set up in all these places. This also means that there must be plans for the dispersal of population—either tactically or strategically, or both. Right now plans are being made to enable tactical dispersal in the event of a yellow warning.

Mr. Martin: Would the hon. member permit me to point out that a month after that we had our first evacuation in St. John's, Newfoundland. Eight days after the particular speech to which my hon. friend referred, I did make a statement on evacuation.

Mr. Hamilton (Notre Dame de Grace): That is the point, however, which I am trying to make. We have the United States director of civil defence speaking on this platform with these other two gentlemen and referring to his plan and his public statements made in June, 1953, one year and two months before this meeting. I suggest, and I do not think I am being unkind, that the Canadian government and the Canadian civil defence organization have not yet faced up fully to the concept of mass evacuation.

I feel that this bolsters and proves my point that here in Canada we have been very far behind what is necessary in the business of proper civil defence in terms of the H-bomb.

[Mr. Hamilton (Notre Dame de Grace).]

Even today—and here I come to the reason for what I feel is public apathy—the civil defence organization under the direction of the minister does not seem to be placing proper emphasis or making sufficient progress in this field of planned evacuation. After all, it is the public we want to influence. As I pointed out earlier, it does not matter what a fine civil defence organization we have, what beautiful plans we have or how well trained our civil defence workers are, if the public—the millions of people who live in cities in Canada—are not civil defence conscious and are not prepared to move, and move in the right direction at the right time. *Saturday Night* of April 16 said this, commenting on this question of plans and their relationship to public apathy:

Faced with the situation in which government spokesmen say something must be done and the public declines to do it, it is not invariably true that the public is right, but it is much more likely to be true that the government spokesmen have failed to find the right approach to the public mind. The average man is not really convinced that there can be nothing in civil defence, that he is doomed to sit and await events with folded hands. What he is looking for are plans that make sense to him. Public apathy can only mean that the present answers that have been given to all the questions from the public leave it very sceptical of the quality of the minds that provide them. The answers seem to make sense only to those who put them out, and even this, sometimes, seems to be a charitable assumption.

There are similar observations in the rest of that article. The department, feeling rather aggrieved by the article, I should imagine, prepare what they feel is a reply, and it is extremely well written by their senior information officer, Mr. Harvey Adams. Whilst I cannot agree in toto with Mr. Adams' observations in the article, I have a great deal of respect for him as an information officer and for the job he is doing. I am not going to read from that article except one paragraph. It appears in the June 11 issue of *Saturday Night*. The paragraph to which I refer concerns evacuation and reads as follows:

Civil defence planning in Canada is based on one hard inescapable fact of the hydrogen age: the only way to survive is not to be there when it happens. In an H-bomb attack, therefore, a city has two alternatives—evacuate or die.

I am not going to comment on the department's position as set forth in this article because I might perhaps be biased. Instead I am going to read a comment on it from the editorial pages of the *Montreal Star*. Here is a newspaper which is essentially sympathetic to the government, a newspaper which, like all Montreal newspapers has, I think, done its utmost to support civil defence in Montreal.

Mr. Martin: Hear, hear.