

were sound reasons why Soviet Russia needed ^{assured} allies. After all, appeasement went on after Munich. It was not a question of ready Germany and unready democracies; appeasement started at a time of unready Germany and ready democracies. Soviet Russia was entitled to assume continued appeasement was exactly that and there was no possibility of anything else.

The first document I want to bring to your attention is one which appears on page 15 of this book and consists of a communication dated the 4th of October, 1938. That is immediately after Munich. It is a communication from Mr. Francois Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris. The last paragraph of that communication reads as follows:

"In that respect, the Munich conference should serve us as a warning. In order that the agreement which assigns to Czechoslovakia new frontiers, and a new place in Europe should become the starting point of a reorganization of the continent on an equitable basis, it is indispensable that the Western Democracies should draw a lesson from the dramatic events of last week. It is necessary that while continuing to affirm their will to peace and neglecting no means of reaching an understanding with the totalitarian States, they should nevertheless eliminate all causes of internal weakness, that they should fill up as quickly as possible any gaps in their armaments, and that they should give to the outside world tangible proof of industry, cohesion and strength. This is the price we must be prepared to pay if Europe is not to undergo again, after a respite of uncertain duration, crises similar to the last one just settled at the Munich conference after threatening for several days to degenerate into general pandemonium."

(D follows)