

salmon, tuna and marine mammals.

Despite considerable opposition, Canada also succeeded in bringing a measure of environmental management to the economic zone and secured the entirety of Canadian environment objectives in respect of Arctic waters. Finally, Canada played a central role in gaining recognition for the coastal state's sovereign rights in respect of seabed resources beyond the 200-mile limit to the outer edge of the continental margin; in return, the coastal state is called upon to share with the international community some of the revenues accruing from mineral exploitation in these areas beyond 200 miles.

The coastal states have obviously done well at the Conference — and none better than Canada — in others' eyes at least. And here I should emphasize that categories overlap, so that the coastal state grouping comprises both developing countries and major maritime powers. Accordingly, it seems clear that the economic zone will be an enduring feature of the new law of the sea and will tend to promote the order and stability which are among the fundamental objectives of any legal system. The stresses which will arise are likely to flow from problems of implementation rather than deficiencies of conception. Thus even the most responsible coastal states already tend to *emphasize national resource rights and to minimize international obligations within the economic zone*. Canada is not free of pressures in this direction in the fisheries field, but a variety of factors are at work which help to maintain some balance here. In the U.S.A., new legislation under consideration by Congress — the Fisheries Protection Act — virtually does away with the idea of any kind of obligation to foreign fishermen in the economic zone.

Still other stresses will arise as a result of the continued insistence of the U.S.A. and Japan that coastal state jurisdiction does not extend to tuna. But this is a problem for the two countries concerned rather than one affecting the integrity of the economic zone concept. Perhaps the greatest strain on that concept will arise from the lack of adequate provisions for the conservation and management of coastal fish stocks which "straddle" the 200-mile limit. Despite prolonged and vigorous efforts, Canada has not been able to secure agreement on such provisions to meet Canadian concerns in respect of fisheries on the "nose and tail" of the banks on the Atlantic Coast. Over-fishing beyond 200 miles in these areas can damage the stocks within the 200-mile limit. Regional and bilateral mechanisms will help, but this gap in the new law of the sea will remain a troublesome factor.

#### Major maritime powers

Turning to the major maritime powers, the results of the Law of the Sea Conference also seem satisfactory from their perspective, recalling again that most of these countries are coastal states as well. As major maritime powers, their overriding shared objective has been to maintain the greatest possible freedom of navigation. Subject to some environmental safeguards, they have improved their position in this respect. So also have the two superpowers and their shared objective of maximum naval mobility. In both cases, the crucial elements of the new law of the sea will be the 12-mile territorial sea and the proposed new regime of free transit passage through international straits. And here let me make clear immediately that the Northwest Passage is not an international strait.