

NATO is one of the best examples of coalescence in foreign policy. I imagine that many Canadians, remembering well the essentially isolationist attitude of Canada throughout the nineteen thirties, are still somewhat astonished, and I think some of them may well be perturbed, that Canada, along with its allies, has undertaken to defend with force the independence, let us say, of Greece and of Turkey. Canada, together with its allies in NATO, through bitter experience, has come to realize that safety cannot be assured by a policy of non-commitment. Through the understanding among NATO's members that consultation among them should precede any action by one of them which is likely to affect seriously the circumstances of the others, it is clear that Canada has undoubtedly given up some measure of its complete freedom of action in international affairs as the price to be paid to ensure a greater measure of security.

Similarly, our commitments to the United Nations require, among other things, that we abandon force as an instrument of national policies and in a sense oblige us, if ever this should become possible in actual practice, to provide armed forces to assert and to enforce the authority of the United Nations against an aggressor. In accepting these obligations, we have showed our willingness to abandon a further measure of complete independence in international affairs to ensure a collective security, rather than to rely entirely upon our own resources which, we realize, are entirely inadequate for our defence in this period. We in Canada have gone through a remarkable revolution in our attitude toward international relations generally in the course of only about twenty years.

I have been discussing the principal difference between the present day and the traditional conduct of a nation's foreign policy and I have mentioned our participation in the work of NATO and the United Nations to illustrate my thesis that in the earlier diplomatic world a nation such as Canada was much more at liberty to go its own way than could now possibly be the case. There are, however, other special relationships for Canada which have come to exercise an important influence on our foreign relations, and while these influences could not accurately be described as restraints or limitations, they are nonetheless significant ingredients in the amalgam of Canadian foreign policy in a world grown too small for independent action or, at least, action which is initiated without due thought being given to any more than the most immediate national consequences.

In developing Canadian foreign policy, the Commonwealth, for example, provides the most effective and most amicable means of communication between the Western world, Southeast Asia and Africa. In this context it is well that we should remind ourselves that the white,