

experts are not likely to be of much use in providing carefully considered sanctions strategies in a timely manner. Middle-power states including Canada should contribute to the creation of a permanent sanctions strategy unit under the auspices of an existing institute for preventive diplomacy. Such a team would benefit from a more stable personnel roster, cumulative institutional memory, shared intelligence resources, a politically low profile relative to the UN secretariat, and the ability to liaise both with governments and secretariat personnel.

The proposed sanctions strategy unit would gather information from a variety of sources - and for a variety of purposes - noted throughout this study. Its most obvious purpose would be to monitor potential crisis spots, formulate appropriate sanctions strategies, and relay this information to member states. These states, ideally, would use this information to influence Security Council debate once the Council decided to become seized of the matter in question. In addition to providing information on the most effective strategies, the unit could also engage in preassessments of the humanitarian consequences of sanctions. Once sanctions were implemented, the strategy unit would continue to provide policy analysis to member states and to the secretariat. The holistic, long-term perspective offered by the unit would complement - rather than duplicate or compete with - the more temporal analyses undertaken by OCHA, for example.

Regardless of who performs strategic analyses related to sanctions, they must incorporate information from a wide variety of sources. A thorough understanding of the target economy will require the cooperation of officials from the World Bank and IMF - cooperation which has been lacking to this point. Given the increased prominence of financial sanctions, strategic analyses will require the input of a variety of experts from different fields. As Stremlau notes, the UN's current "capacity to comprehend and deal with financial sanctions is much weaker than with commodity sanctions because financial measures are legally and technologically much more complex."⁷⁸ In addition to their technological and legal complexity, however, the planning of financial sanctions requires access to highly sensitive information regarding asset ownership and transactions. For this reason, the specific targets of financial sanctions must be identified by states themselves, working closely with those in the banking industry.

Finally, it is important for the international community to build upon the lessons of past sanctions episodes. It would be especially helpful to engage in more exercises on the model of the Copenhagen Round Table on the United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia.⁷⁹ These exercises help to preserve institutional memory, and to increase our capacity to engage in strategic planning for future situations.

⁷⁸ Stremlau, section five.

⁷⁹ See UN Security Council document S/1996/776, Annex: "Report of the Copenhagen Round Table on the United Nations Sanctions in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia, held at Copenhagen on 24 and 25 June 1996."