

fouling of the atmosphere and may in some degree have a harmful effect on peoples' health and their moral and physical condition, but also -- and this is the most important point -- because the race to build up nuclear weapons will be accelerated even more by the new series of experimental nuclear explosions'.

"Clearly, then, dangers of further experimentation in this field are admitted. It may have grave effects both on our own health and on future generations; it is ultimately a threat to the security of mankind; it increases international tensions and reduces the possibility of agreements in other fields. If this is the belief of the leading statesmen of the nuclear powers, why can they not stop the tests? But it is not only the responsibility of the nuclear powers; nuclear testing affects all nations; to deal with it is the responsibility of all of us represented here. Can we not, as rational beings, act in our own interest?"

ADVANTAGES OF BAN AGREEMENT

"The advantages of a test-cessation agreement are many. Such an agreement would not give a special advantage to this or that country or alliance, but would be in the interest of all humanity. Let me summarize the truly impressive gains which a nuclear-test ban agreement would achieve.

"First, as the major powers themselves recognize, it would significantly reduce radiation hazards and improve international security.

"Second, it would inhibit the development of more and more destructive nuclear weapons.

"Third, it would arrest the development of nuclear weapons by an increasing number of nations, a danger whose gravity can be recognized by all and, one may say, especially by the present nuclear powers.

"Fourth, it would be a start on disarmament. My Delegation entirely endorses the view expressed by the Acting Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report, in which he emphasized that the first step toward disarmament is to stop nuclear testing. We share his sincere hope 'that the nuclear powers will realize that the whole world is hoping and praying that an agreed first step may be taken soon'.

"In short, an agreement to end nuclear-weapons tests would be a first clear proof that the many declarations by the great powers that they want to end the arms race and not mere words but will result in real and effective action.

DEVISING PRACTICAL MEANS

"I have reviewed so far the weighty reasons in favour of putting a stop to nuclear tests. In my opinion these factors, taken together, should convince every rational man that the need for a solution is urgent. It remains, however, to devise practical means for achieving this goal. In recent months several suggestions have been made which, my Delegation believes, should be endorsed by this Assembly.

"In the first place, we strongly support the proposal put forward in the 18-Nation Committee for an early cut-off date by which all testing would be ended -- January 1, 1963, or, we would hope, earlier. The acceptance by this Assembly of a target date

should provide added incentive to speedily resolve the remaining differences.

"Second, Canada endorses the proposal for an immediate ban on all testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. Such a proposal is common to the draft treaties advanced by both sides, and an agreement would be a substantial step in the direction of a comprehensive ban. It would greatly reduce or even remove the health hazard resulting from nuclear testing. Moreover, differences over inspection do not constitute a barrier to agreement in this field.

"Third, my Delegation wishes to underline the importance we attach to the contribution of the eight unaligned nations represented at the Geneva negotiations in putting forward compromise proposals on a verification system. The Canadian Delegation has taken the stand at the 18-Nation Conference -- and we reaffirm it now -- that the eight-nation proposals provide a sound basis for an agreement satisfactory to all concerned. A system based on existing national networks of observation posts with new posts if necessary, an international scientific commission to process and examine data from these stations, and the obligation of states parties to the agreement to furnish the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious event on their territory -- these are the main elements of the eight-nation proposal which we believe should be incorporated, without further delay, in a draft treaty for ending all nuclear tests.

ONE MAJOR PROBLEM

"Agreement on these points would narrow the differences separating the two sides to one major question: What is to be done if there is a dispute as to the nature of an event which has taken place in the territory of one of the parties to the agreement? It appears from new scientific data submitted last August at Geneva by the U.S.A. and Great Britain that the area of uncertainty, where doubtful events could arise has been considerably reduced. Nevertheless, controversy persists over the question of how to verify that no underground testing takes place. Technical problems which have been raised in the examination of this subject could not usefully be discussed in this Committee. However, there is a fundamental matter of principle which my Delegation is firmly convinced must be borne in mind by the nuclear powers in their negotiations in this field.

"It is agreed, I think, that no foreseeable inspection system will fully meet the preoccupations of all parties to a test-ban agreement. What is needed, then, is a *reasonable assurance* that their interests will be protected. But this criterion cannot be applied exclusively to the risks which may be inherent in the treaty itself; it is equally important not to lose sight of the grave risks which humanity continues to run in the absence of such an agreement.

"It has been alleged, for example, that a verification system involving 'on-site' inspection could mean that espionage data would be collected by the inspectors. In my opinion, the possibility that the international inspectorate could be used in this way is exceedingly remote. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union would seriously contend that this risk compares in any way with the dangers which they themselves agree are inherent in continued testing.

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