moval of the anomaly of Canadian participation in NATO but not in OAS, and removal of doubt about Canada's support of the principles on which OAS is founded.

Among the arguments mentioned in opposition to Canadian participation in OAS were the limitations on Canada's resources, the risk that Canada's position in OAS would either be labeled as that of a satellite of the U.S. or would be harmful to U.S.A. prestige to the extent that Canada's attitudes diverged from that of the U.S. of significant issues, and finally the loss of Canada's ability to present an uncommitted view on problems arising in the hemisphere.

(b) Cuba: There was complete agreement on the serious threat which Communist influence in Cuba presents to the whole hemisphere. With respect to methods of countering this danger however there were two basically different approaches. Some felt that the situation warranted drastic measures. Others believed the Cuban Revolution was brought about by underlying causes which are to be found in many other areas in Latin America. These unhealthy tendencies must be dealt with on a long-term basis through programmes of economic assistance, information, cultural interchange, and foreign policies in the interest of the freedom and economic opportunity of mankind. The committee agreed that there is need for expressing to the peoples of less-developed countries the social objectives of our society. To compete successfully with the Communists in the emerging countries we must explain our system in terms of social justice as well as personal freedom.

2. Strengthening NATO:

There was full agreement of the necessity of strengthening the conventional forces assigned to NATO. It was noted that both Canada and U.S. have met their NATO force goals. Several specific NATO defense problems were discussed: the desirability of having small nuclear weapons for tactical use; the inhibition on the use of major weapons in the absence of adequate conventional forces; the question of control by a multi-national organization over a NATO nuclear strategic force; and the necessity of making the U.S. nuclear retaliatory weapons invulnerable. It was recognized that, if the Soviet Union moved at any time in force to cut off access to West Berlin, NATO would be ready to respond with the necessary force.

China Policy:

The committee discussed trade with Communist China. The members were agreed that there should be no trade in strategic goods. The Canadian members, however, stated that in Canada there was general support for a policy of trade with China in non-strategic goods on the grounds that to cut off all trade would not weaken the hold of the Chinese Communist Party and that trade helps maintain the strength of the Canadian economy. The view was also expressed that it can assist in some measure to preserve a small reservoir of goodwill in China which could be of long-term benefit to the West. Some U.S. members, while acknowledging that the U.S. does trade in certain non-strategic commodities with countries of Eastern Europe, were of the view that tradematerially assists the Chinese in reaching their economic objectives, raises moral issues on which the U.S. public feels deeply and strengthens the Chinese position in Asia. The Canadian chairman referred with pleasure to the statement made in the House of Commons the previous day by the Prime Minister regarding the happy solution to the difficulty which has arisen over the supply from U.S. sources of grain unloading equipment and the committee agreed that this was a good example of continuing co-operation between the two countries in all fields.

The committees also discussed the closely related questions of diplomatic recognition of Communist China and its representation in the United Nations. While neither Canada nor the U.S. have recognized the people's Republic of China, it was generally agreed that the issue of representation in the United Nations would soon confront the two nations and that at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly there would likely be increased support for seating representatives of Communist China. The 'two China' concept was considered as a possible solution for the representation of China. It was pointed out that the admission of a Chinese Communist delegate to the United Nations would be interpreted in many places in the U.S. as an act of appeasement and might lead to strong demands that the U.S. leave the United Nations. The Canadian members pointed out that Canadian public opinion is divided on the issue.

4. Disarmament:

The committees agreed that disarmament negotiations must be continued despite the difficulties and lack of concrete progress so far. Recognizing the growing military potential of Communist China, probably independent of Russia, it was suggested that at some future time provision might be made for Communist China to participate in realistic disarmament discussions. Confirming the continuing need to seek agreement on banning nuclear tests under adequate safeguards, the committee was concerned as to how long the U.S. should postpone the testing which is required to advance nuclear capability, in the face of Russia's refusal to negotiate an agreement in good faith. Only by thorough inspection around the world could each side be certain that the other was not secretly taking the lead in more efficient weapons. Canadian members repeated that public opinion in Canada now was against resumption of nuclear tests, but could change in the face of continued Russian rejection of inspection and the growing possibility of the Russians conducting secret tests.

5. Defense Production Sharing:

In view of the inter-dependent nature of the economic as well as the military aspects of the common defense effort, the Committee confirmed the need for a strong industrial base in Canada as an essential part of North American defense. The defense production-sharing programme continues to provide opportunities for Canadian industry to participate on an equitable basis with U.S. industry in defense development and production. The com-