

The Board shows the desirability, for management as well as for reasons of politics, of having the functioning of a safeguards agency firmly under the control of a small, effective executive body dominated by states with a strong interest in safeguards. It also demonstrates the problems that such a set-up can create. One might question whether dissatisfied states, drawing on their experience with the Agency, would support a similar concentration of authority in the executive body of a chemical weapons verification agency, or similar rules for its composition.

If significant powers were given to a body analogous to the Agency's General Conference, the higher degree of "politicization" of that body might be an inhibiting factor. Although restricting an agency purely to a verification function might reduce some of the problems, others could still be anticipated and might work to the detriment of such an agency. Areas of particular concern would be powers with respect to the development, implementation and oversight of the safeguards function, as well as the ability to follow up compliance problems at the political level. These powers should presumably be vested where they can be exercised most effectively and reasonably. It is not clear that the best entity would be composed of all members, even assuming a strong general commitment to safeguards. If the role of a political body in judging whether or not there is compliance with obligations raises concerns, it is hard to see how these would be reduced by vesting such powers in a general membership body which could be even more subject to the feared disabilities and abuses.

There is no veto on the Board, even for questions of non-compliance, and this practice seems to have worked well. A tradition of consensus decision-making has developed within the Agency, but this has not always been the case nor is it necessarily desirable. During the early development of the Agency's safeguards, majority votes were required in the Board. The current process of consensus-formation may tend to restrict Board activity, even though it reduces overt disagreement. If voting began occurring more frequently in the Board, it could be attributed to politicization, and could therefore be a bad omen. It seems impossible, therefore, to consider the effect of particular decision-making rules without also considering the political climate of the organ concerned and of the agency as a whole.

The Director General

The Director General is the chief administrative officer of the Agency. He or she is appointed by the Board, with the approval of the General Conference, for a renewable term. Some of his or her appointments, such as deputy directors general and inspectors, are subject to Board approval, as is the preparation of the budget. The Director General is required to submit reports to the Board regarding instances of possible non-compliance.