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the aggressor as well. "Nuclear winter" could compound the horrific effects of a major nuclear exchange. But the risks of miscalculation or accident cannot be eliminated completely. As a result, there is widespread anxiety about the pace of arms control negotiations and interest in examining new ways of arresting the arms race. A range of ideas has been proposed, such as freezing nuclear arsenals at current levels, confidence-building measures to promote greater understanding and trust between East and West, improved crisis management mechanisms and declarations on nuclear weapons-free zones and zones of peace.

The promotion of peace in the nuclear age and the safeguarding of democratic freedoms have been constant, consistent and dominant themes of Canadian foreign policy. Our goal has been the security of all countries at progressively lower levels of armaments and forces, both nuclear and conventional. We consider that the Final Document of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament remains valid. Adopted by historic consensus in 1978, it sets out a program of arms control and disarmament priorities dealing with nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and conventional weapons and forces.

We have worked with others in the United Nations in New York, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the MBFR talks in Vienna and the CSCE meetings to find practical, concrete ways of easing the tensions between states and eliminating the threat of war. In Stockholm, our objective is the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. To work, these CSBMs must be militarily significant, politically binding and adequately verifiable.

Our involvement in nuclear issues started with the initial development of the atomic bomb during the Second World War. Subsequently, we decided to forego the acquisition of such weapons ourselves — the first "nuclear capable" country to do so — and no nuclear weapons are now stationed on Canadian soil. (Nor could any be without the agreement of the Canadian Government.)

In the intervening years, we have tried to discourage both the expansion of nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. That is why we have been strong advocates both of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT provides the political and legal framework, as well as the technical basis, for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. It is a critical and widely supported element of international security. We have also been very active in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in nuclear suppliers' meetings to develop effective safeguards against the use of nuclear reactor technology and materials for the development of nuclear weapons; and we have discouraged the spread of nuclear weapons to the seabed and to outer space and have signed international treaties to this effect.

Though we renounced the nuclear option for ourselves, we did not seek to have it renounced by the Alliance of which we are a member. Ever since the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, our security has depended on the existence of corresponding Western means to deter the use of such weapons, and we have played a supporting role in ensuring the credibility of the West's nuclear deterrent. The Alliance has not ruled out the first use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack from the East, on the grounds that to do so