

participated in NATO's enforcement of sanctions in the Adriatic. Canada also leads the multinational sanctions assistance mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which helps to ensure compliance with sanctions. In February 1993, Canada led a multinational fact-finding mission on sanctions monitoring in Albania.

Canada has taken part in CSCE conflict prevention missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. Serbia refused to renew the mandate of the CSCE missions and the monitors were forced to leave at the end of July 1993. Canada also participated in a similar mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, led a CSCE fact-finding mission to Kosovo and took part in a CSCE mission to investigate human rights violations in detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada's financial contribution to various preventive diplomacy missions now totals more than \$2 million.

European Security: the Nuclear Dimension

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of steps were taken to bring the Soviet nuclear arsenal — left in the hands of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine — under unified control, to reaffirm negotiated and unilateral arms reduction measures, and to ensure that only one state — Russia — inherited the Soviet Union's status as a nuclear weapon state.

- Centralized control over the weapons was established in Moscow, with the governments of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan gaining a de facto veto over their use.
- All tactical nuclear weapons were shipped to Russia for storage and eventual dismantlement and destruction.
- All four successor states and the US signed in May 1992 a protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) committing all five to fulfil the terms of the Treaty, to carry out the reductions in a certain time frame and committing Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to accede to the NPT "in the shortest period of time." This is known as the Lisbon Protocol. Since May 1992, Russia, Belarus and

Kazakhstan have ratified START and Belarus has acceded to the NPT. Kazakhstan is committed to acceding to the NPT but appears to be delaying formalization of the decision until President Clinton's scheduled visit in January.

More troubling is the position of Ukraine, which has procrastinated in fulfilling its commitments concerning the disposition and destruction of nuclear weapons, ratification of START and accession to the NPT. In November, the Ukrainian parliament agreed to a highly conditional ratification of START and the Lisbon Protocol. One of the conditions involves disavowing Article V of the Lisbon Protocol, which requires Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Others concern the provision of financial and technical assistance for dismantling weapons, the provision of international security guarantees, and compensation for the value of nuclear weapons components.

Ukraine's stance risks derailing the strategic arms reduction process and complicating the extension of the NPT in 1995.

On establishing diplomatic relations with Ukraine in 1992, Canada sought assurances that Ukraine would fulfil its arms control commitments, particularly pertaining to nuclear weapons. On several occasions since then, Canadian ministers and officials have urged Ukraine to follow through, most recently during discussions between Foreign Affairs Minister Ouellet and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko at the CSCE ministerial meeting in Rome.

Suffocating the Nuclear Threat

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation strategy is predicated on:

- 1) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to states beyond the five acknowledged nuclear powers (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China); and
- 2) achieving reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, with the aim of eventual elimination.

Fundamental to this strategy is defence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A global non-proliferation regime is incon-

ceivable without the NPT. The norms established by the Treaty form the foundation of all other efforts aimed at countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Over the years, Canadian efforts have been tailored to achieve the greatest non-proliferation advances possible, in light of prevailing political and security circumstances. This has resulted in several notable achievements, including increased NPT adherence, tightened nuclear supplier guidelines and bilateral US-Soviet nuclear arms reduction treaties. Stronger, more targeted efforts are now in order.

The indefinite extension of the NPT at its 1995 extension and review conference is Canada's primary objective. The other two options available — extension for a fixed period or periods — do not guarantee preservation of the Treaty and the

Canada pursues a long-term, multi-faceted non-proliferation strategy, of which NPT is the cornerstone.

benefits it provides. In the context of the review portion of the 1995 conference, Canada is also pressing for a further strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. Two regrettable examples underscore the importance of this goal: North Korea's defiance of the inspection obligations it freely entered into when it acceded to the NPT and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and Iraq's conduct of a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Canada is also working with other nuclear suppliers to promote more effective controls on the export of material, equipment and technology relevant to nuclear weapons. In addition, Canada is contributing to the International Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, which aims to find peaceful employment for ex-Soviet nuclear weapon and missile specialists.

To supplement the NPT, Canada is working towards an early conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, scheduled to begin in the Conference on Disarmament in January (see *Bulletin* #22). In Canada's view, the resultant treaty should be open to signature by all and sustained by a strong verification system. Canada's expertise in verification is enabling us to play a leading role in ongoing CD consultations on a CTBT.