

both in this and Western cities, there can be no doubt. The receipts of such a company would have the preference whenever any advances were required, and its stores, there can be no doubt, would always have as much in them as their capacity and the state of the markets would admit of. It would greatly facilitate business, and diminish temptations to fraud. It would also lessen the average losses incurred by the present system, and be hailed as a boon by capitalists and bankers.

To have a company with a fair capital to take the responsibility of storing, would be a vast improvement on the mode now customary. Persons who have neither capital nor established character would soon be driven from the field, and the money market relieved of a class of securities which always cause uneasiness and anxiety.

With this, and the alteration in the law before spoken of securing the rendition of a criminal from the United States, the business of warehouse receipts would be placed on a satisfactory footing.

MAILS TO THE WEST INDIES.

WE are glad to see from the English papers received in town yesterday by Cunard steamer, that the Postmaster-General has announced that he will receive tenders in October for the conveyance of the mails between Halifax, Nova Scotia, and St. Thomas, West Indies, via Bermuda. As our commercial future,—the trade we may expect to transact with the West Indies and South America is largely involved in this question of direct mail communication, we earnestly trust that the Canadian authorities will take some steps in the matter. What these should be, we will not presume to point out, but the ministerial Finance Council may be certain of this—that if a line of Provincial steamers is chartered or purchased, and put on the West India route the mercantile community and the public at large will cheerfully incur the extra cost.

THE FISHERIES.

MANY persons are of opinion that the proper method of meeting the difficulties encountered by our fishermen in competing in the United States markets, is by granting bounties sufficiently high to have the effect of putting them on an equality with their rivals. We do not share this opinion. We are aware that a small bounty has been given to Canadian vessels engaged in some branches of the fishery, but as this is not the case with New Brunswick or Nova Scotia, and the whole thing must now be settled on some general basis, the time cannot be considered an opportune for a discussion of the subject. We object, then, to bounties for the following among other reasons.—In the first place, they are at variance with the laws of political economy. They are erroneous in principle and pernicious in practice. It is quite certain that whatever is paid to the fishing, to any other interest in the shape of bounties is just so much abstracted from the pockets of the whole people for the benefit of a class. In the next place it is by no means clear that the granting of even large bounties will have the effect of enabling us to compete in the United States markets. It is quite within the bounds of probability that, in the present temper of the United States, if we grant bounties they will raise theirs in a corresponding degree, and, under any circumstances, the discriminating duty remains. Further, we object to them because experience has shown that the parties sought to be benefited rarely, if ever, derive any advantage commensurate with the evils inflicted by their adoption. The English fishing interest has increased prodigiously in value and activity since the abolition of bounties, and it is altogether a mistake to suppose that, even in the United States, the system is productive of the good which some people seem disposed to attribute to it. After careful enquiry among fishermen and others who might fairly be supposed to be favourable to the system, Mr. Perley records his opinion in the following words:—"With the whole system of the American fishing bounties there appears to exist an organized system of frauds, and the voluminous instructions of the Treasury Department, issued from time to time to meet those cases, clearly prove that, notwithstanding all the care and caution of the Department, and all the vigilance and astuteness of its many excellent officers, vast sums of money go annually into the pockets of unscrupulous men, while it is exceedingly doubtful if the actual fishermen are at all benefited thereby." The reason assigned for the

bounty in the United States is the high duty on materials used in the construction and outfit of vessels, which in 1852 was estimated at \$10.00 per ton more than ours. Since that time it must have vastly increased, and it is altogether probable that the difference in cost of construction, equipment and sailing between an equal number of their vessels and ours amounts annually to a larger sum than the bounty.

But it will be urged, granting that bounties are in some senses objectionable, how else are we going to compete in the American market against a heavy discriminating duty? Our answer is: We are not obliged to compete there at all. No doubt it would be a very desirable thing if we were allowed to do so on equal terms, but as that is not likely to be the case, the right way of meeting the difficulty would be by adopting the same means as those by which the abolition of the Reciprocity Treaty was met, viz., by seeking other markets, and adapting our products to their requirements. Very few among us but anticipated a serious and permanent falling off of trade from the abolition of the Treaty, and now you hear just as few regretting its loss. It has taught us that the inestimable lesson of self-reliance, and shown us that, however valuable the markets of the United States may be, yet that we can exist without them, and in time find others to take their place.

The main reason why our unrivalled fisheries are in so backward and lamentable a condition is, because either from ignorance or indifference, or both combined, we do not turn them to a proper use. Our fishermen have the markets of England, Germany, and the Mediterranean open to them on terms of perfect equality, and these will take all the fish we are ever likely to catch, if they are only properly prepared for the market, but until that is set about with a will we need not, and ought not, to expect success. Hear what Mr. Perley says of the fisheries of the Bay of Fundy in 1852, and they are even in a worse state now than at the time when this was written.—"The fish of the Bay of Fundy when drawn from the water are most excellent, they can scarcely be equalled, and certainly not surpassed, elsewhere; yet these admirable fish, either from ignorance, neglect, or laziness, or all combined, are so wretchedly cured as only to be fit for the poorest markets, and are only sold because there is an insufficient supply of fish generally. While thousands of quintals of cod caught in the Bay of Chaleur, and cured in the best manner, have been shipped by the Jersey merchants to Brazil, Spain, Portugal, Sicily and the Italian States, not a single quintal of fish has been shipped from the Bay of Fundy to the markets of the Mediterranean, because none has been cured fit to send."

The Herring Fishery, which is capable of being made the most valuable of all our coast fisheries, is half ruined from causes that are easily removed, and can only be ascribed to the grossest ignorance or stupidity. The herring derives nearly all its commercial value from the way in which it is cured. The Dutch and English well understand this, and under the inspection and supervision of their Fishery Boards, put up herrings, which vast as is the quantity produced, have never yet exceeded the demand. The greatest care is taken to clean and cure the fish directly they are taken, as upon that their value very much depends. The Dutch even cure and pack them in barrels on board as they are taken. On the contrary, our herrings are never bled or cleaned until long after they are caught, and very often are not cleaned at all. The result of this is that the greater part of the fish caught have no commercial value, and instead of (as we might easily do) supplying the European markets with a valuable article of commerce, we do not produce a single barrel fit for that purpose. We have seen ourselves a schooner load of fine herrings which had been thrown into the hold of the vessel just as they had been taken from the sea, (neither bled or cleaned), and sailed there in bulk. What commercial value can fish trodden, broken, thrown out on the wharf with a pitchfork and treated this way possibly have? We could fill a volume with instances of the neglect and stupidity which have gone far towards rendering valueless this important part of our national resources; but we must hasten to a conclusion, which is, that the way to protect our fisheries is not by giving bounties, which at best are of questionable utility; but by adopting totally different systems of catching and curing the fish, by enforcing the laws for their proper protection, by the erection of landing piers, breakwaters, harbors of shelter, boat slips, capstans and mooring for boats and small vessels; all of which

should be provided at the public expense as one of the best means of assisting and encouraging the fisherman, whose home is by the seaside. To these objects the Americans who use our fisheries, might very well be made to contribute by a license fee bearing some proportion to the value of the privilege, at least until such time as they see fit to admit us to their markets on equitable terms. Above all the aid of capital must be brought to bear before our fish can be properly developed. The fisherman with his ill equipped boat, and scanty means, probably in debt even for that to some merchant on shore, can do but little.

In the United States as is well known, large amounts of capital are employed in the business.

In England and Scotland no expense is spared in the equipment of the immense fishing fleet which finds profitable employment in other coast, and steam is now largely used.

The Jersey merchants, who visit the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, go into it as a regular business. With us who have the harvest of the sea close to our own doors, have hitherto been too ignorant or too supine to put forth our energies to gather it in.

Since this, and the preceding article were written we have perused the report of Commander Fortin on the Canadian Gulf and River Fisheries. It is gratifying to find that even with the very intelligent means at his disposal, when compared with the extent of coast, he has been able at least to preserve order and to cause the laws to be better respected. It shows that an efficient police force either afloat or ashore or perhaps both, would be of the greatest possible service.

Subjoined is a table, affording a comparative view of the Bank returns, the Bank rate of discount, the price of Consols and the price of wheat in Great Britain, during a period of three years, corresponding with the 24th August, as well as ten years back, viz., in 1857.

At corresponding date with the present week	1857.	1865.	1866.	1867.
Circulation, including bank post bills.	19,996,297	22,310,676	21,597,724	21,400,000
Public deposits	5,766,003	5,992,243	5,411,629	6,000,000
Other deposits	9,765,813	14,714,485	18,763,474	19,600,000
Government securities	2,653,684	10,386,299	10,711,281	12,700,000
Other securities	1,348,385	21,139,949	24,888,198	12,000,000
Reserve of notes & coin	6,456,576	7,065,194	5,550,115	11,000,000
Coin and bullion	11,220,131	14,271,129	14,774,282	14,000,000
Bank rate of discount	5 1/4 per cent.	4 1/2 per cent.	2 1/2 per cent.	2 1/4 per cent.
Price of consols	90 1/2	89 1/2	89 1/2	91 1/2
Average price of wheat	59s 1d	13s 1d	7s 2d	9s 1d

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

WHILE the abundant harvest, with which we are favored, affords the promise of general prosperity throughout the Dominion in the period immediately before us, we must not overlook the fact that the demand and prices obtainable for our surplus products depend mainly on the state of the European markets, and that these again depend on the existence of peace or war between the great powers of that Continent. When last we wrote on this subject we expressed the opinion that the rumours of an immediate contact between France and Prussia were unfounded, but that, in all probability, the struggle was only deferred for a future and not very distant day. The visit of the French Emperor to his brother of Austria has since given rise to fresh suspicions of the most alarming character, and the world has been perplexed with the most contradictory reports of the real objects of the imperial conference at Salzburg. On the one hand, we are told that Napoleon proposed to Francis Joseph to form a Confederation of Southern Germany, with Austria at its head, as a counterpoise to Prussia, and, on the other hand, it is asserted that the visit was merely one of ceremony, and chiefly intended to afford the two Emperors the melancholy gratification of mingling their tears over the grave of poor Maximilian, the brother of one of the mourners and the victim of the other. The London Daily News has a new version of the affair, as the telegraph informs us. It says:—"An alliance of France and Austria is impossible, the only result of the Salzburg conference is the translation of the remains of the Duke of Reichstadt to Paris." The "result," perhaps—but what was the intention? For our own part, we believe that nothing is more likely than that Napoleon went to Salzburg for the express purpose of paving the way for a future union of the German States South of the Main, in alliance with France, and we are much mistaken if Europe will not be convinced of this before long. It is true that at present such a step would be dangerous, for it would be an infringement of the treaty of Prague, and would lead to an instant war