

gods they worshipped did make such revelations, at least occasionally. The various and conflicting claims of diverse and adverse religious systems afford a reason for this interference. On these and other grounds a revelation possesses an external probability, anterior to evidence; and this probability adds to the reasons for investigating the evidence of such professed revelations as offer themselves.

We must not, however, suppose, that the apparent correspondence between the matter of these revelations, and the unassisted conclusions of natural reason, furnishes an unerring criterion of their truth: for we often see that conclusions, to which we are led upon high grounds of probability, are proved by subsequent experience not to be correct: and it must of course be acknowledged that it may be the express object of such revelation to correct the conclusions of unassisted reason; and, consequently, that there may be portions of Divine revelation expressly and intentionally at variance with our previous impressions. If, therefore, the whole evidence in support of any professed revelation should prove sufficient to recommend it to our earnest attention,—it ought not to stagger us, if we find some portions of it to be inconsistent with our previous conviction. On the contrary, natural reason itself would lead us to suppose that it would be an object of revelation to correct our previous notions: and we should, consequently, upon purely natural