

peacetime surveillance, to close the waters in time of crisis, and generally, to deter potential intruders who might otherwise seek to exploit Canadian Arctic waters. Second, given scarce resources, there is a lesser case for developing an ASW capability in the Arctic basin. This is less convincing both because the size of the basin makes the task more difficult, and because an active ASW capability would at that point be inextricably caught up in the US naval strategy of carrying ASW to the Soviet SSBN sanctuaries. This policy, which has been the source of a protracted debate during the Carter and Reagan Administrations, calls for the insertion of US nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea, and envisages the use of conventional weapons against Soviet sea-based retaliatory nuclear forces in order to deter the Soviets from initiating or continuing a conventional war in Europe.¹⁶

¹⁶ See John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe", and Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy", in *International Security*, Fall 1986, pp. 3-89.