

entry Vehicles (MaRV) and other potentially destabilizing systems such as space-based Ballistic Missile Defence Systems.

3. **Equipment Constraints.** The basic idea here is to single out specific types of weapon systems and supplies that confer a uniquely offensive capacity on military forces and devise arrangements (generally rear-basing) that neutralize or minimize their offensive character. By concentrating on specific components of modern conventional military forces, their multi-purpose character (i.e. they can perform offensive and defensive missions with the same basic equipment) can be shifted subtly toward more purely defensive capabilities. The classic illustration of this is Alford's famous suggestion that bridging equipment always be stationed far to the rear in Central Europe. The "simple" removal of bridging capabilities precludes the possibility of a "standing start" conventional attack unless the attackers are prepared to rely on existing (very vulnerable) bridges and roadways. Alford has suggested a similar type of Constraint Measure for attack aircraft, arguing that if they were based the same distance from the borders of potential adversaries as their combat range, they could serve only a defensive function.⁶⁰ These sorts of Constraint Measures cannot promise a guarantee against surprise attack. What they can do, however, is (1) inspire confidence in the primarily benign, defensive intentions of participating states through the very process of negotiating and abiding by serious Constraint Measures (this is a fundamentally cooperative and non-aggressive sort of undertaking) and (2) provide some measure of advance warning if offensive actions are at some future point planned. The moving forward of bridging equipment, major stocks of ammunition and fuel, self-propelled artillery, and attack aircraft would be a pretty unambiguous indication of offensive intent. Other proposals have suggested constraints on the number and/or location of tanks and limitations on the positioning of major combat vessels like aircraft carriers.

4. **Nuclear Free Zones.** Proposals calling for the creation of "Nuclear Free Zones" are not necessarily associated with CBM negotiations and it is not entirely clear that such proposals ought to be considered as Constraint Measures or even as CBMs. Part of the confusion can be attributed to the fact that there are at least two basic types of Nuclear Free Zone proposals. One type calls for "promises" that no nuclear weapons will be used in a particular area (frequently a city or town) or unilaterally declares that a specified region is a Nuclear Free Zone. These might be considered Declaratory Measures. They cannot be verified in any way (other than after-the-fact) which is always true of Declaratory Measures. A second type of Nuclear Free Zone proposal has to do with the stationing of nuclear weapons. These proposals call for no nuclear weapons being stationed within specified geographic regions. They can be verified in terms of the absence or presence of the weapons themselves or their delivery vehicles. This suggests that, in principle, there is no difference between a proposal for keeping mobile bridging equipment at least 100 kilometers from a border region and a proposal to keep all nuclear weapons at least 100 kilometers from a border region. In practice, of course, it is much easier to conceal a small number of tactical nuclear weapons than it is to conceal bridging equipment and, more important, the use of those several tactical nuclear weapons could be much more consequential. This should not disqualify equipment-related Nuclear Free Zone proposals, however, from consideration as Constraint Measures.

Constraint Measures are "aggressive" Confidence-Building Measures and appear to offer substantial scope for improving the political relations between hostile states by actually imposing physical limitations on the sorts of military forces and activities that produce anxieties about surprise attack or coercion. It is not entirely clear, however, how effective these types of Constraint Measures might or can be in practice.

First of all, almost all of the Constraint Measures noted here involve steps that can be "undone" in short order. Restricted equipment or supplies can be brought up to restricted

⁶⁰ Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects", p. 11.

