

telling their own leaders, that the danger is too near....

'I decided to...try to inject high-level political energy into East-West relations...'

Last fall I spoke of an ominous rhythm of crisis. I drew attention to the confluence of three potentially disastrous trends — the resort to force to settle disputes, the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the worsening state of East-West relations.... I decided to use Canada's influence to call international attention to the danger, to try to inject high-level political energy into East-West relations, to turn the trend-line of crisis, to work at the crossroads of common interest between the two sides....

Since last fall I have taken that message to Paris, The Hague, Brussels and Rome; to the Vatican, to Bonn, to London and to Zurich. I presented it in Tokyo, and Dhaka, and to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi; to Peking, to Washington, and to the United Nations. I met with leaders in Prague, East Berlin and Bucharest, to ensure that our message was heard in the highest councils of the Warsaw Pact....

At each step along the way I urged political leaders to commit themselves personally; to put peace at the top of their agenda; to exercise the political leadership the current dangerous situation demands — to restart the dialogue between East and West.

'I told President Reagan...that a message of peace was not getting through.'

I told President Reagan that the signals he was sending of American strength were being received in the East — but that a message of peace was not getting through. I told leaders in Eastern Europe that the harsh rhetoric of their declarations had guaranteed rejection of the Warsaw Pact's more positive proposals, and there were some.

Misperceptions and mistrust on both sides run deep. But I believe we are beginning to see signs of progress....

At our insistence, NATO foreign ministers participated early last month in the opening of the Stockholm Conference, to underline the importance they attached to high-level political dialogue. The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers responded to this Western move and also went to Stockholm. Of special significance was the presence in Stockholm — and it would not have happened other-

wise — of US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who met for over five hours. Both also met with my colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen.

Broad political contact was thus re-established between the countries of East and West for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September, in the shadow of the Korean airliner tragedy....

'I return with several conclusions from my talks in Eastern Europe...'

I have just returned from consultations with the leaders of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Romania.... I return with several conclusions from my talks in Eastern Europe:

— First, I was struck by the contrast between the cordial, reasonable, and non-ideological private talks, and the occasional blast of Warsaw Pact fundamentalism to which we were subjected in public. I believe this disparity underlines the importance of personal contact and private dialogue. Without that dialogue, both sides risk remaining prisoners of their own polemic.

— Second, because we were able in our private talks to strip away much of the invective surrounding key issues, I believe we were able to begin a process of exposing areas of common interest. That process will take time, but I dare hope that a new level of maturity in East-West relations is within our grasp.

— Third, if we are to reach that level of maturity, we shall have to grapple with difficult problems of misperception on both sides — blind spots and distortions, subjective errors of analysis or of judgment....

'Let me suggest ten principles of a common bond between East and West...'

In reflecting on these conclusions, and on the substance of my talks in eastern and western capitals alike, it is clear to me that areas of common interest are beginning to emerge. Let me suggest ten principles of a common bond between East and West:

- (1) Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- (2) Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- (3) Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.

- (4) Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- (5) Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- (6) Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- (7) Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- (8) Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries — so-called horizontal proliferation.
- (9) Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- (10) Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side....

I shall be writing to...leaders in both alliances, and to other statesmen, to propose that these are principles upon which both sides can build.... There is a way around the impasse of recent months. There are signs of promise and I believe that the trend-line of crisis has turned....

In the months ahead Canada will build on the progress so far achieved, to ensure that our ideas are further developed and implemented. We have no monopoly on proposals, nor do we expect them to gain acceptance overnight. What counts is that some, though by no means all, of the key East-West indicators show that their downward course has been arrested.

'My own personal contribution...will definitely continue'

My own personal contribution, though necessarily less intensive than in recent months, will definitely continue. One will understand that 16 countries plus the United Nations in three months is a pace that I could not keep for an entire year.... Our initiative will also be taken forward by my Cabinet colleagues, by our ambassadors abroad and by all Canadians who share our purposes.

Canada will play its part in the councils of the West, in bilateral talks, at multilateral meetings and conferences, in contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies. ...If these talks bog down, Canada will endeavour to ensure that political leaders again take a personal hand in energizing them....

Following further consultations with
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